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Abstract This paper reconsiders the long term e⁄ect of ￿scal policy on interest rates
using a real-time dataset of macroeconomic and ￿scal variables in a panel of 17 OECD
countries over the period 1989-2009. We show that, after controlling for cross sectional
dependence using a Factor Augmented Panel, interest rates are mostly related to global
factors. Among domestic ￿scal variables, the level of expected public debt mantains a positive
correlation with interest rates, while among the global factors, the aggregate monetary and
￿scal stance play a quantitatively sizeable role. We then analyze how impulses from the
aggregate ￿scal stance in￿ uence each country￿ s interest rates. We ￿nd that these e⁄ects are
modest in large economies and particularly strong in economies characterized by low initial
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11 Introduction
The global ￿nancial crisis and its adverse e⁄ects on the budget de￿cits of advanced
economies have revived the debate on the link between ￿scal policy and interest rates. The
strong convergence observed among advanced countries￿interest rates before the crisis came
to a halt when the global recession provoked a substantial deterioration of sovereigns￿￿scal
de￿cits. Financial markets then suddenly started to discriminate between borrowers. These
developments seem to suggest that: 1) under increased capital market integration, interest
rates tend to follow global factors rather than domestic variables; 2) nonetheless, the e⁄ects
stemming from ￿scal policy can be large and substantial when sovereign face adverse bud-
getary shocks. The objective of this paper is thus to analyze the impact of ￿scal policy on
sovereign yields in a broad panel of OECD countries, taking into account the heterogene-
ity in responses to common shocks. In particular, we answer the following questions: How
do markets discipline borrowers under high ￿nancial integration? Do global factors matter
more than domestic factors? Does domestic ￿scal policy a⁄ect at all the cost of borrowing
for governments?
We follow and expand the existing literature along three dimensions. First, we start from
the quite established result according to which the relation between ￿scal policy and inter-
est rates becomes statistically signi￿cant when using ￿scal projections rather than actual
data (Reinhart and Sack 2000, Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba, 2002; Gale and Orszag, 2004;
Laubach 2009; Afonso 2009). Hence, we construct a real-time dataset based on macroeco-
nomic projections collected from several vintages of the OECD economic outlook. The use
of real time data serves di⁄erent purposes: i) it is meant to take into account the forward
looking behaviour of ￿nancial markets; ii) it avoids possible simultaneity problems arising
from the use of actual data. Collecting ￿scal projections from an independent agency like
the OECD rather than o¢ cial governments plans, is motivated by the evidence presented in
Beetsma and Giuliodori (2010) and Cimadomo (2008). The authors show how governments￿
released budget plans tend to be overly optimistic in terms of expected ￿scal outcome. Thus,
2the forecasts released by the OECD are less prone to this "optimistic bias￿ .
Second, since ￿scal de￿cit by itself may not in fact be a proper measure of current ￿scal
stance, another improvement is that, following the insights of Alesina and Perotti (1996), we
look at the overall policy mix instead of the budget de￿cit as a measure of ￿scal stance. We
thus decompose the expected de￿cit into revenue and spending as forecasted by the OECD.
Finally, our third improvement is methodological. We implement a new estimator which
takes explicitely into account cross sectional dependence and heterogeneity in traditional
panel models. The methodology (Factor Augmented Panel) consists in estimating the un-
observed common factors from the data by means of principal components and plugging
them back into the equation, allowing for heterogeneous propagation of the common shock.
Recent econometric literature (Pesaran, 2006, Bai, 2009) shows that not accounting for these
e⁄ects in panel data gives rise to biased and inconsistent estimates.
Overall, we ￿nd that using standard panel techniques provides results that are similar to
those found in previous literature: the estimated e⁄ect of a 1% increase in budget de￿cits on
long term yield is about 10 basis point; and 2 basis points for a 1% increase in public debt.
However, once we account for cross sectional dependence, the estimated e⁄ect of budget
de￿cits become smaller in magnitude or even insigni￿cant, while the e⁄ects of public debt
remains unchanged. We also distinguish the components of public de￿cits and ￿nd that
higher government spending increases real interest rates while tax increases reduce them.
Contrary to previous ￿ndings, we also ￿nd that the non linear e⁄ects of ￿scal policy are not
related to public debt, but to the di⁄erence between debt stabilizing de￿ct and projected
de￿cit, which tend to matter in periods of ￿nancial distress. Finally, the presence of cross
sectional correlation across countries leads us to analyze the contribution of the unobservable
common factors to explain domestic interest rates. Two common factors account for more
than 60% of the panel variance and they represent global monetary and ￿scal policy. When
we analyze the e⁄ects of aggregate ￿scal policy on domestic interest rates, two main results
emerge. First, we ￿nd that spillovers are statistically signi￿cant and quantitatively more
3important than idiosyncratic elements. Second, the e⁄ects appears to be strongly heteroge-
neous across countries. In fact, there appears to be clusters of countries, with the highest
e⁄ects found in mediterranean countries and Ireland, and the smallest e⁄ects found in "safe
heaven" countries (like the US, Germany, Norway).
We proceed as follows. In Section 2, we provide a brief review of the literature. In
Section 3 we explain the methodological framework. In Section 4 we discuss our dataset
and its properties. In Section 5 we present estimation results. In Section 6 we analyze the
e⁄ect of ￿scal policy spillovers, while in Section 7 we do some robustness checks. Section 8
concludes.
2 Literature Review
There is a large empirical literature on the e⁄ects of ￿scal policy on interest rates. Despite
the large production, the results are still mixed. A large body of the literature is based on
US data, but an increasing number of studies is also based on European and OECD data.
As reported by Gale and Orszag (2003) in their survey of existing work, out of 59 papers
reviewed, 29 found a signi￿cant positive e⁄ect, 11 had mixed results, while 19 found a
predominantly insigni￿cant e⁄ect. In spite of the mixed results, we can identify few areas of
consensus: 1) studies that employ measures of expected rather than actual budget de￿cits
as explanatory variables tend to ￿nd a signi￿cant e⁄ect of ￿scal policy on interest rates
(Feldstein, 1986; Reinhert and Sack, 2000; Canzoneri et al. 2002; Laubach, 2009); 2) the
e⁄ect of public debt appear to be non-linear (Faini, 2006; Ardagna et al. 2007); 3) the e⁄ects
of public debt are quantitatively smaller than those of public de￿cit (Faini, 2006; Laubach,
2009); 4) the spillover e⁄ects of ￿scal policy seem larger than domestic e⁄ect (Faini, 2006;
Ardagna et al. 2007); 5) the e⁄ects found in cross country studies are smaller than those
found in single country studies.
The papers more closely related to ours are Reinhart and Sack (2000), Chinn and Frankel
4(2005) and Ardagna et al. (2007). Reinhart and Sack (2000) estimate the e⁄ects of ￿scal
policy in a panel of 19 OECD countries using annual ￿scal projections from the OECD. The
authors ￿nd that a one percentage increase in the budget de￿cit to GDP increases interest
rates by 9 basis points in the OECD and by 12 basis points in the G7. The authors though
do not consider the level of debt and do not control for global factors. Chinn and Frankel
(2005) focus on Germany, France Italy and Spain, while also considering evidence for UK,
the US and Japan. They use the expected debt rather than the expected de￿cit and also use
projections from the OECD. They ￿nd mixed evidence about the e⁄ects of expected debt,
but the results seem to be signi￿cant once they include the US interest rate as a proxy for
the "world" interest rate. Ardagna et al. (2007) estimate the e⁄ects of ￿scal policy in a panel
of 16 OECD countries with annual actual data, from 1960 to 2002. They ￿nd that a one
percentage increase in the primary ￿scal de￿cit to GDP increases long term interest rates by
10 basis points, a result similar to the one in Reinhart and Sack (2000). Contrary to Reinhart
and Sack (2000), Ardagna et al. (2007) also control for the level of debt, ￿nding that the
results are non linear: interest rates increase for debt to GDP level above 60%. Moreover,
the authors control for global factors by including cross-sectional averages of explanatory
variables. They ￿nd that average debt and de￿cits have signi￿cant (spillover) e⁄ects on
interest rates, but domestic variables still a⁄ect interest rates while controlling for global
factors.
In this paper, we follow Reinhart and Sack (2000) and Chinn and Frankel (2005) and use
￿scal projections instead of actual data. On the other hand, we follow Ardagna et al. (2007)
in adopting their empirical speci￿cation. However, our main di⁄erence from these papers lies
in the methodology. In fact, our starting point is to recognize that interest rates are mainly
driven by unobserved common factors, and that these factors a⁄ect each unit in the panel
di⁄erently. The econometric literature provides di⁄erent methodologies to correct for cross-
sectional dependence (Bai, 2009; Pesaran, 2006). Here, we follow the methodology proposed
originally by Giannone and Lenza (2010) in their study of the Feldstein-Horioka puzzle. They
5show that the high correlation between domestic savings and investments found in previous
studies vanishes once the panel takes into account this factor structure approach. They
attribute the high correlation between domestic saving and investment previously found in
the literature as a result of a misspeci￿ed regression.
3 Methodology
While the theory acknowledges that in ￿nancially integrated economies global factors play
a role in determining interest rates, empirical results have proven inconclusive. Some authors
have found that idiosyncratic factors play a small role in determining domestic interest rates
(Ford and Laxton, 1999; Faini, 2006) other authors instead have found that that domestic
conditions still play a signi￿cant role (Ardagna et al. 2007; Chinn and Frankel, 2007).
In this section we propose to approach the question with the help of a new methodology,
which is meant to isolate pure idiosyncratic shocks from global factors. In particular: we
￿rst review the methodology previously used in the literature; we then show how these
methodologies are not robust since they fail to properly take into account the country speci￿c
response to global shocks.
3.1 The econometric model
Let￿ s assume that the interest rate is rit for (i = 1;:::;N;t = 1;:::;T) and xit is a
vector of controls which includes ￿scal variables for (i = 1;:::;N;t = 1;:::;T). A standard
approach to the analysis of the e⁄ects of ￿scal policy on interest rates with panel data would
resolve to the estimation of the following model:
rit = ￿i + ￿xit + "it (1)
where some form of heterogeneity across countries is allowed by introducing time-invariant
country characteristics in the form of ￿xed e⁄ects (￿i). This is the model estimated by
6Reinhart and Sack (2000) in a panel of 20 OECD countries. This model is likely to yield
be biased estimates since it does not take into account the presence of common source
of ￿ uctuations in the level of interest rates; that is, it treats the data as if they are cross-
sectionally independent while in open economies with integrated capital markets the presence
of common factors that a⁄ect all interest rates simultaneously is likely to be a widespread
feature (Eaton, 2000).
The literature has recognized this problem by adopting the following two empirical strate-
gies. A ￿rst approach (Breedon et al. 1999; Chinn and Frankel, 2005) is to ￿nd an a priori
indenti￿able variable (or a subset of variables) which might a⁄ect contemporaneously the in-
terest rates across countries, and introduce them directly in the panel, so that the regression
model becomes:
rit = ￿i + ￿xit + ￿zt + ￿it (2a)
where the variable (zt) is a vector (or a matrix) of identi￿ed common factors. An al-
ternative approach would instead consist in accounting for unobservable common shocks
by introducing "time" dummies. This would lead to the estimation of the following model
(Ardagna et al. 2007):
rit = ￿i + ￿t + ￿xit + ￿it (2b)
where the time dummy (￿t) is equivalent to assuming that in each time period there is
a common shock which a⁄ects homogeneously countries￿interest rates. Both (2a) and (2b)
are then aimed at controlling for common factors in the determination of interest rates, and
can then be used to test the relative importance of global versus national factors.
Both these approaches su⁄er from shortcomings. While acknowledging common sources
of ￿ uctuations, they impose homogeneous e⁄ects across countries. If the propagation of the
common shocks is similar, though not identical across countries, the e⁄ect of ￿scal policy on
interest rates cannot be consistently estimated. Assume for instance that the national interest
7rates are cross sectionally linked due to the presence of an unobserved "world" interest rate
(Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1990). If economies are characterized by di⁄erent levels of ￿nancial
integration, and/or have di⁄erent sizes, then it is likely that the transmission of shocks to
the common world interest rate will be di⁄erent according to country speci￿c characteristics.
Failing to take into account this e⁄ect will lead to biased results. Therefore, in our estimation
we will adopt the following model:
rit = ￿i + ￿t + ￿xit + uit (3)
uit = ￿iFt + ￿it (4)
where Ft corresponds to the p common factors and both ￿i and Ft are unobserved, while
￿it is a country idiosyncratic error which is assumed to be independently distributed. In
this model, if ￿i - the p ￿ 1 vector of the country speci￿c loadings - are di⁄erent from zero,
and if ￿i 6= ￿j for (i;j = 1;:::;N;i 6= j); then not including those p factors will introduce
correlation between the regressors and the error term leading to biased estimates of the ￿
coe¢ cients. In fact, by estimating model (3), we allow also the xit to be correlated with the
common unobserved factors Ft, so that the latter can impact interest rates not only through
the factor structure (4) but also indirectly by a⁄ecting the regressors. Our approach is
to estimate a Factor Augmented Panel (FAP) according to the methodology suggested by
Giannone and Lenza (2010). In the next section we highlight their estimation strategy in
detail.
3.2 Estimation Strategy
As a ￿rst step, we need consistent estimates of the p unobservable factors. We obtain
them by means of principal components. By stacking all the observations for our N cross
8sections in the matrix Wt:
Wt = (r1t;x1t;:::;rnt;xnt)
0
we can represent the system in the following way:
Wt = ￿Ft + W
id
t
where Ft is the T ￿p matrix of common factors, ￿ is the matrix of factor loadings and W id
t
is the idiosyncratic component. Under the assumptions that common factors are pervasive
and that idiosyncratic shocks are not pervasive, the matrix of common factors Ft can be
consistently estimated by extracting principal components from the matrix W. In fact,
under these conditions consistency is achieved as the number of series and the number of
observations increase. Moreover these estimates are robust to some form of non stationarity
in the data (Giannone and Lenza 2010).We then extract a number p of principal components
that explain a certain threshold percentage of the panel variance1. We then plug these
estimated factors (b f1t;:::; b fpt) into the equation, and allow the coe¢ cients on these factors to
di⁄er across countries.
Our baseline equation is then:
rit = ￿i + ￿t + ￿xit +
p X
k=1
￿ik b fkt + ￿it
which can be consistently estimated by standard panel techniques. Notice that if the factors
loadings (￿ik) are non zero, estimation of equations (1￿2) leads to estimates that are biased
and inconsistent since the error term contains the common factors. While we allow the
response to the common factors (￿ik) to vary across country, we keep the coe¢ cient (￿)
on the ￿scal variable of interest ￿xed across countries. This is meant to keep the results
consistent with those obtained in previous studies who ￿nd signi￿cant e⁄ects of domestic
1We also apply the Bai and Ng (2002) criterion for the optimal number of factors.
9￿scal policy on interest rates using homogeneous coe¢ cients spec￿cations.
Normally, having an estimated element in the regression would introduce a further source
of uncertainty, which would require (block) bootstrapped standard errors. However, we rely
on the result by Giannone and Lenza (2010), Bai (2003) and Bai and Ng (2006) according
to which when the number of countries is not too small relative to the sample size there is
no generated regressor problem2.
Before turning to the discussion of the data, it is important to notice that this is not the
only methodology proposed by the literature to tackle cross-sectional dependence. Other
strategies can be found in Pesaran (2006) or Bai (2009). In particular, Pesaran (2006)
has proposed an estimator called the Common Correlated E⁄ects (CCE), which consists
in introducing cross section averages of the dependent and the independent variables in
the equation. Since cross-country aggregates average out idiosyncratic components, for large
cross-sectional dimensions they tend to approximate the common factors. While this method
is simple and intuitive, we believe its shortcoming is that it does not provide us with a
direct estimate of what the common factors are, which is something we are interested in.
Nevertheless, to make sure that our results are not driven by the choice of the estimator, in
one of our robustness checks we follow the approach by Pesaran (2006). The ￿ndings point
toward equivalent results.
4 Data description and properties
4.1 Data
Our data are taken from a real-time semi-annual dataset of macroeconomic and ￿scal fore-
casts on OECD countries, based on the December and June issues of the OECD￿ s Economic
Outlook , from 1989 to 2009. The countries included are 17: Australia, Austria, Belgium,
2Bai (2003) and Bai and Ng (2006) show that factor scan be treated as known if the number of countries
is larger than the square root of the sample size.
10Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Norway, Netherlands,
Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom and United States. Data on short term interest rate and
the long term yields are taken from Datastream.
Since we are interested in isolating the e⁄ects of ￿scal policy on interest rates, one should
use both long term ￿scal projections and expected interest rates to properly achieve identi-
￿cation. As noted by Laubach (2009), long-horizon projections of ￿scal policy and interest
rates are presumed to be little a⁄ected by the current state of the business cycle. Unfor-
tunately, these data are not available for a large group of countries. In our dataset, the
projected horizon is either one or two years ahead. In particular, in the editions from 1989
to 1994, the Outlook publishes in year t the projections for year t+1, both in the June and
December issue. Starting from 1996, the OECD publishes also projections for year t + 2
in the December issue, while the June issue contains only the projection for the year t + 1.
Therefore in our dataset we have: one year ahead projections for the June issue and for
December issue between 1989 and 1994; two years ahead projections for the December issue
from 1995 to 2009. While these forecasts embody di⁄erent information sets, we pool them
together to achieve higher degrees of freedom. However we checked that pooling projections
at di⁄erent horizons does not a⁄ect our main results.
A second issue concerns the choice of the dependent variables. Since we are not able
to gather data on historical forward rates for a large group of countries, for the purpose of
our analysis we use current data on three di⁄erent dependent variables: the nominal long
term yield (nlty); the ex-ante real long term yield (rlty); the slope, de￿ned as the di⁄erence
between long term nominal yield and short term interest rate (slope). For each dependent
variable, we use the value observed in the month following the realease of the forecast; in
particular, the January value for the December issue and the July value for the June issue.
This approach is useful because the forecasts on ￿scal variables are likely to take into account
current markets conditions and the level of interest rates. Measuring interest rates after the
release of the forecasts also reduces the problem of reverse causality. Furthermore, it only
11involves the reasonable assumption that ￿nancial markets are forward looking and are able
to incorporate rapidly all the available information.of three di⁄erent dependent variables.
Since the ex-ante real long term yield is unobservable, it has to be constructed from the
data. In particular, what is needed is a measure of markets￿expectations of in￿ ation ten
years ahead. Since the Outlook provides forecast on in￿ ation only for the period t+1, we
proxy in￿ ation expectations in t+10 with the ￿trend in￿ ation￿calculated with the help of
a Kalman Filter applied recursively on the series of in￿ ation expectations for the year t+1.
As indicators of ￿scal stance, we use the following variables: the expected primary de￿cit
(pdef); the expected public debt (debt); the expected revenues (rev); the expected primary
expenditure (spend);all measured as shares of current GDP3. We use primary de￿cit instead
of total de￿cit to avoid the problem of reverse causality. As a measure of debt, we use
the total gross ￿nancial liabilities of the general government4. Since it is not clear whether
stocks or ￿ ows are more important and since the stock of debt represents the cumulated
de￿cits (credit risk) we introduce both indicators throughout the estimation. In order to
control for the e⁄ects of monetary policy, we add as explanatory variable the expected short
term rate. and we add as further controls the exptected in￿ ation (inf l) and expected real
gdp growth (g). Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics. In the next section we provide
some exploratory analysis to recognize the importance of common factors in the behaviour
of interest rates.
4.2 Properties
The importance of cross sectional correlation of the interest rates can be easily observed
by visual inspection. We thus present our dependent variables in Figures 1 to 3. We have
3In one of our robustness check, we also use trend GDP measured with a Hodrik-Prescott ￿lter as a
scaling variable. Results are similar.
4A better measure could be the Net Financial Liabilities of the General Government. However, this
measure is still subject to substantial harmonization problems since it is not yet established how to compare
the value of governments￿assets across countries. An even better measure would include contingent liabilities.
However, there is an ever bigger issue on how to compare these items across countries. This is though an
interesting area of future research.
12grouped the countries from right in the following way: ￿rst are the scandinavian countries
(Norway, Sweden, Denmark); then we group the EMU countries (Finland, Ireland, Italy,
Spain, Austria, Belgium, Netherlands, France, Germany); then we group the anglosaxon
countries (Australia, Canada, the UK); ￿nally we group Japan and the US. Figure 1 reports
the behaviour of the nominal long term rate over the entire sample. First, we notice that the
beginning of the sample is characterized by higher level of interest rates, both in the EMU
countries and outside. Starting after 1994, there appears to be a strong convergence in the
long term rate, with an especially marked reduction of the interest rates in the peripheral
EMU countries (Ireland, Italy, Spain). This is consistent with the presumption that on
the accession path to the common currency and higher ￿nancial integration, the long term
interest rates become endogenous. Nevertheless, the convergence is observed also outside
EMU: throughout the 2000s, interest rates remain low particularly so in Japan, while they
begin to diverge only during the crisis. Figure 2 reports the cross section of ex-ante real rates.
We can notice a similar common trend of downward reduction, but there is overall more
idiosyncracy with respect to what we observed for the nominal rates. Thus we can expect
that in our quantitative analysis, idiosyncratic factors will play a bigger role in explaining
real rates compared to nominal rates. Finally, in Figure 3 we report the behaviour of the
slope. The slope may be correlated across countries because of common components in
growth rates and monetary policy. In fact, in the period between 1995 and 2000, which was
characterized by higher growth rates, we notice that the slope of the yield curve is upward
trending in almost all countries in the sample. It starts to ￿ atten in the run up to the crisis,
when it again trends upward due to the common reaction of advanced countries￿monetary
authorities to counteract the adverse e⁄ect of the global ￿nancial shock.
Once we have gauged the importance of cross correlation, the next step is to determine
the number of common factors responsible for these comovements by quantitative analysis.
We perform principal component analysis on the sample5. As shown in Table 2 , the ￿rst
5See the Appendix for details on the implementation of principal component analysis.
13two principal components tend to explain up to 65% of the panel variance, indicating how
strong is the impact of common factors in explaining the behaviour of interest rates. When
we extract these factors, we notice that for the nominal and the real rate, there is a strong
correlation with the aggregate monetary and ￿scal stance in the sample (Figure 4 to 5),
suggesting that, under increasing ￿nancial integration, interest rates are related through
the convergence of short term rates in￿ uenced by the monetary authority and through the
impact on aggregate savings in￿ uenced by the aggregate ￿scal policy stance. The factors
for the slope (Figure 6) seem instead to be related to the aggregate ￿scal stance and the
aggregate level of public debt.
In order to verify statistically the importance of common factors, we test for the presence
of cross sectional dependence using Pesaran￿ s CSD test 6. We report the results for all the
variables in our sample in Table 3. We can see that there is a strong indication of cross
sectional dependence, since under the null of independence the statistic is distributed as
CSD ￿ N(0;1). Before turning to the estimation, we brie￿ y comment on the results on
the stationarity tests, which we report in Table 4. We ￿rst implement the Pesaran￿ s (2007)
and we ￿nd indication that all the variables can be treated as stationary. There is mixed
evidence with respect to the ￿scal variables. We therefore implement the Moon and Perron￿ s
test (2004) which accounts for multifactor structure, we are able to reject the null of unit
6This test is based on testing the following set of hypotheses:
￿
H0 : ￿ij = ￿ji = corr(uit;ujt) = 0 for i 6= j
H1 : ￿ij = ￿ji 6= 0 for some i 6= j
Given the estimated pairwise correlation coe¢ cients of the residuals:
b ￿ij = b ￿ji =
PT






















is distributed as a Standard Normal for N ! 1 and T su¢ ciently large. This statistic is particularly useful
as a slight modi￿cation of the CSD statistic can also handle unbalanced panels
14root7. We thus conclude that all the variables in our panel can be treated as stationary.
5 Estimation Results
5.1 Baseline Model
We now turn to the estimation. Once we extracted the factors from the data, we introduce
them in the estimation equation. Therefore our baseline model can be represented as:
rit = ￿i + ￿t + ￿Xtjt￿1;i + ￿i1 b f1t + ￿i2 b f2t + ￿it
where rit is one of our measure of interest rates and Xtjt￿1;i is the matrix of regressors,
which contains: the expected short term rate; the expected in￿ ation rate; the expected
growth rate; the expected primary de￿cit; the expected public debt. For each variable, the
projected forecast is for the next calendar year for the June issues and for the December
issue between 1989 and 1994; two years ahead for the December issue between 1995 and
2009.
Tables 5-7 report the results obtained from the estimation of the baseline equation using
respectively, the ex-ante real interest rate, the nominal long term interest rate and the slope
as dependent variables. In each table, columns 1 and 4 report the results from the classical
￿xed e⁄ect estimator (FE), columns 2 and 5 report the results from the two-way FE estimator
(2FE) and columns 3 and 6 report the results from the factor augmented panel estimator
(FAP). Moreover, columns 1-3 show the results obtained from using the whole sample, while
the columns 4-6 show the results without including the latest ￿nancial crisis8. Finally, in
each table we report the results of two disgnostic tests. The row ￿CSD￿shows the value
7We were unable to implement the Pesaran, Smith and Yamagata (2008) test, given that our time series
is too small.
8There are few reasons in fact to suspect that results including the crisis might produce biased estimates:
1) the pace of deterioration of budget de￿cit was unprecedented; 2) more importantly, the measure of budget
de￿cit and debt might fail to take into account the explicit and implicit costs of rescuing the banking sector,
which might therefore a⁄ect the ￿scal variables by serious measurement errors.
15of the Pesaran￿ s (2006) test to detect cross-sectional dependence; the statistic is distributed
as a normal under the null of cross-sectional independence. The row ￿CIPS-error￿reports
the p-value from the Pesaran￿ s (2003) test to detect unit root in the residual9. We start by
looking at Table 3 which analyzes the determinants of the real interest rate.
[Table 5 here]
The results obtained from FE indicate a positive correlation between ￿scal variables and
real interest rates: a one percentage point increase in the expected primary de￿cit to GDP
ratio increases interest rates by around 11 basis points if we include the crisis and 9 basis
points if we exclude it. Regarding the debt, the e⁄ects are smaller: a 1% increase in the
expected debt to GDP ratio increases interest rates by around 2 basis points if we include
the crisis and almost 2.5 if we exclude it. The results are in line with those obtained in
the literature (Ardagna et al., 2007), except that, contrary to the authors, we ￿nd that the
coe¢ cient on expected public debt is correctly signed. This may be a direct consequence of
using ￿scal projections rather than actual data, which reduces the problem of endogeneity.
Regarding the residuals, while they seem well-behaved in terms of stationarity, the value of
the CSD test indicates a strong rejection of the null of cross sectional independence. We
therefore turn to discuss the results obtained from estimators that introduce unobserved
common factors in the panel, the 2FE and the FAP. We notice ￿rst a strong decrease in
the value of the CSD statistics (from above 40 to -4), with a better performance obtained
of the FAP against the 2FE (-3 vs. -4), indicating that time e⁄ects are not enough to
remove cross sectional dependence. With and without the crisis, the 2FE shows that de￿cit
has a signi￿cant impact on interest rates, with e⁄ects between 6 and 7 basis points, while
the coe¢ cients on debt are almost unchanged. If we look at the FAP, we see that, in the
speci￿cation with the crisis the e⁄ect of domestic de￿cits is still statistically signi￿cant, but
the value of the coe¢ cient drops to 4 basis points, while if we exclude the crisis it becomes
9The test detects unit roots in heterogenous panels with cross-section dependence. The Null hypothesis
assumes that all series are non-stationary.
16less signi￿cant and slightly weaker. This di⁄erence would be consistent with the idea that
in an environment of lower de facto ￿nancial integration - as it is during a ￿nancial crisis
- domestic ￿scal policy can regain part of its in￿ uence. As for the level of public debt,
instead its e⁄ect stays signi￿cant across all speci￿cations and the inclusion or exclusion of
the crisis does not signi￿cantly alter its magnitude. Overall, the results suggest that omitting
the heterogeneous impact of common shocks in the panel provides an upward bias in the
estimated coe¢ cients.
Before discussing the other two tables of results with di⁄erent left-hand side variables,
we have a brief look at the other control variables. The expected short term interest rate is
always positively and signi￿cantly correlated across all the speci￿cation, but the magnitude
of the coe¢ cients decreases signi￿cantly when using the FAP, indicating that the sensitivity
of interest rates to own monetary policy development is smaller in an open economy setting.
The coe¢ cient on GDP growth is positively signed and its estimated e⁄ect is around 10
basis points for a 1% increase in expected growth rate; however, as for the domestic de￿cit,
also in this case the signi￿cance is limited to the sample that includes the crisis. Finally,
we ￿nd a negative relation with the expected in￿ ation. This is a direct consequence of the
open economy: if nominal rates are equalized on the world capital markets, then higher
expected in￿ ation rate will reduce the measured ex-ante real interest rate (the "Mundell-
e⁄ect", Mundell, (1963)).
In Table 6 we show that the results of Table 5 are con￿rmed and somehow reinforced
when using the nominal interest rate as a dependent variable.
[Table 6 here]
The expected de￿cits are not signi￿cant when using the FAP, with and without the crisis.
The e⁄ect of expected public debt are also slightly smaller, going to almost 1 basis point for
a one percentage increase in future public debt to GDP. We notice that, among idiosyncratic
factors, only monetary policy and public debt preserve a signi￿cant correlation with nominal
17rates: one interpretation of these results is that, in open economy, only monetary policy and
credit risk a⁄ect the movement in long term nominal rates.
Finally, in Table 7, the results for the slope indicate that there is no signi￿cant correlation
with the ￿scal variables.
[Table 7 here]
This result also holds whether or not we include heterogeneous transmission of the global
factors. The only signi￿cant relationship is with the expected growth rate: a 1% increase in
expected growth widens the slope by almost 30 basis points. While the lack of a correlation
with the public debt is at odds with ￿ndings from the literature on risk premia (Favero et al.,
2003), in one of our robustness check we show that this lack of correlation can be directly
attributed to the inclusion of Japan in the sample. Once we exclude Japan, public debt
turns out to be an important determinant also of the slope of the yield curve.
5.2 Non linear e⁄ects of public debt
So far we have shown that, when we account for cross-sectional dependence, public debt
remains the only ￿scal variable that is consistently correlated with interest rates. A one
standard deviation increase in public debt (which has an average value of 30% in the sample)
increases nominal and real interest rates by 28 to 30 basis points. Since the literature points
out that the e⁄ects of public debt on interest rates may be di⁄erent at di⁄erent level of
public debt, in this section we investigate more in details these non-linearities. The results
are reported in Tables 8 to 10. In each table, we include: the debt squared; splines for values
of debt above and below the median (66% of GDP); splines for values of debt above and
below the 75th percentile (83% of GDP), including (columns 1 to 3) and excluding (columns
4 to 6) the latest crisis.
[Table 8 to 10 here]
18Overall, we fail to ￿nd any signi￿cant non linear e⁄ect. The results are similar to the
one obtained in the baseline equation: when we the test of equality of coe¢ cients we ￿nd
statistically equivalent results. This absence of non linearities in the e⁄ect of public debt
has two possible interpretations. On one hand, the non linearity previously found in the
literature can be related to the omission of the common factors. In fact, whenever the
correlation between the right-hand side variable and the factor changes this will change the
estimated coe¢ cient, and omitting the factor from the regression might give the appearance
of a non-linear e⁄ect (or a structural change). On the other hand, it might be the case that
the non linear e⁄ects of public debt are due to changes in the estimated coe¢ cients, which are
themselves function of a given set of variables. Hansen (1999, 2000), proposes a methodology
to endogenously identify and deal with these threshold models. The econometric literature
is currently exploring ways to combine cross-sectional dependence and non linearity (Cerrato
et al., 2008, Kapetanios et al., 2008). However, the implementation of these techniques is
beyond the scope of this paper, but we plan to follow it in future research.
5.3 Splitting the De￿cit
In this section we show the results from splitting the primary de￿cit into its components.
Theoretical and empirical arguments, in fact, point out that the budget de￿cit may be an
insu¢ cient statistics of the ￿scal policy stance. For example, consider an intertemporal model
with ricardian agents. If public goods are less than perfect substitutes with private goods,
then an increase in public spending is less than fully o⁄set by an increase in private savings,
thus leading to an increase in consumption and an increase in interest rates. In the same
setup, a tax-￿nanced temporary increase in government spending that leaves unchanged the
budget de￿cit will have also an e⁄ect on private savings and interest rates (Faini, 2006).
There is also a large empirical literature on the non-keynesian e⁄ects of ￿scal policy
(Giavazzi and Pagano, 1990). This literature shows that private consumption responds
signi￿cantly to ￿scal policy consolidation. One hypothesized channel of transmission is the
19level of interest rates10: if ￿nancial markets respond signi￿cantly to changes in the ￿scal
policy stance, then the reduction in interest rates will a⁄ect positively consumption and
investment. Moreover, the empirical literature shows that ￿scal consolidation based on
spending cuts higher than tax increases is more likely to produce these non-keynesian e⁄ects
(Alesina and Perotti, 1995; Ardagna, 2004; Akitoby and Stratmann, 2008).
Table 11 present the results, this time reporting only the estimates obtained with the
FAP. As before, Columns 1 and 2 show the results for the real interest rates; columns 3 and
4 for the nominal interest rate, while columns 5 and 6 refer to the slope; for each variable,
the ￿rst column includes the crisis while the second column excludes it.
[Table 11 here]
Overall, while all the other control variables keep the same sign, signi￿cance and magni-
tude, we ￿nd that the ￿scal variables enter the equations with the expected signs: primary
spending to GDP is positively related to the various measures of interest rates, while revenues
to GDP are negatively related. There are, however, huge disparities in the signi￿cance of
the coe¢ cients when changing the left-hand side variable. The estimates show that the two
components of ￿scal policy bear a signi￿cant correlation only when the dependent variable
is the real interest rates: a one percentage point increase in spending to GDP increase real
interest rates by almost 3 basis points; a one percentage point increase in revenues to GDP
decreases real interest rates by 4 basis points. We do not ￿nd any signi￿cant correlation
when using the nominal interest rate or the slope.
The results suggest that the composition of the ￿scal policy stance is a plausible candidate
in the explanation of divergent patterns of real interest rates. The lack of a signi￿cant
correlation with other measures of interest rates, which more directly include risk-premia,
is though at odd with previous ￿ndings (Akitoby and Strattman, 2008). A plausible reason
is that we examine advanced countries while other studies, as for example Akitoby and
Stratmann (2008), focus on developing countries; so the results cannot be directly compared.
10See, for example, Bertola and Drazen (1993) or Balduzzi et al. (1997).
205.4 The e⁄ect of EMU
The aim of this section is to check whether the introduction of a common currency
within EMU represents a structural break in our sample. In fact, the highest degree of
￿nancial integration among EMU members may represent a stronger convergence, or imply
that common factors are more important or di⁄erent for these group of countries. In our
results we do not ￿nd evidence of structural breaks in the common factors11, but we do
￿nd some di⁄erences in the signi￿cance of the idiosyncratic factors. We have replicated
the results for each dependent variable allowing for a di⁄erent response of the regressors
depending on weather they refer to countries that took part to the EMU after 1999. We
estimated a speci￿cation with a spline, where all the regressors enter interacted with two
dummy variables: one equal to 1 for the EMU countries after 1999, and another equal to 1
in all the other cases. The results are reported in Table 12.
[Table 12 here]
When we consider the real interest rate as a dependent variable, the results point towards
the presence of a structural break for the de￿cit, which is signi￿cant for countries not be-
longing to the EMU. This can be explained by the strong ￿nancial integration among Euro
countries, which makes idiosyncratic ￿scal shocks irrelevant for the determination of the real
interest rates. When we use the long term interest rate as a dependent variable, instead,
we notice a break in the coe¢ cient on the in￿ ation rate, which is positive and signi￿cant
only for countries and periods not belonging to the EMU. We interpret this result as the
"credibility e⁄ect" due to the presence of an in￿ ation averse Central Bank. Finally, when we
use the slope of the yield curve as a dependent variable we ￿nd that the coe¢ cient on the
expected de￿cit becomes highly signi￿cant for the EMU countries when including the crisis
period, suggesting that, indeed, expected de￿cit became an important risk factor during the
11We re-extracted the factors from subgroups (EMU vs non EMU) and run two separate regressions for
the two subgroups. The coe¢ cients were similar to a constrained regression where we do not interact the
factors with the EMU dummy, which are the results reported in the text.
21latest ￿nancial crisis.
5.5 Sovereign risk and ￿scal policy
The objective of this section is to investigate the impact of ￿scal policy on sovereign
risk. The latest ￿nancial crisis has in fact dramatically revealed that domestic ￿scal policy
still bears a signi￿cant impact on domestic interest rates. The next question is then: is
the response of sovereign risk premia to ￿scal policy di⁄erent in times of crises? To answer
this question one needs ￿rst a good proxy of sovereign risk. In principle one should use
the spread between a sovereign bond and a "benchmark" country (where identify the "risk-
free" rate). For example, the EMU countries are often compared to Germany, so that the
di⁄erential between, let￿ s say, the Italian and German yield represents a measure of sovereign
risk premium. This approach is though problematic in our sample. First, it is di¢ cult to
￿nd a common benchmark for all the countries in our sample. Second, the presence of
exchange rate risk will introduce measurement error in the left hand side variable, likely to
give imprecise estimates12. For these reasons, we keep the slope of the yield curve as our
preferred measure of risk premia. In particular, we regress the slope on our same set of
controls (in￿ ation, growth) and interact the ￿scal variables with a dummy which identi￿es
crises periods. So far we have shown results including and excluding every time the latest
￿nancial crises. In this section, we also include previous episodes of domestic ￿nancial crises
as coded in the database by Laeven and Valencia (2008). The idea is to see how ￿scal
fundamentals are priced in times of intense distress.
Since we fail to ￿nd non linearities in the debt, we add a new explanatory variable as
a regressor, which is the "de￿cit gap". The de￿cit gap is the di⁄erence between the surplus
that - for given real interest rates and growth rates - stabilizes the debt to GDP ratio and
the actual government budget balance13. We believe this is a more appropriate variable than
12A possibility could be to use interest rate swap di⁄erentials. However, we do not have this measure for
many countries over the entire sample.
13See the Appendix C for a detailed description on how the variable is constructed.
22public debt to detect the impact of ￿scal policy on risk premia. Public debt is in fact a stock
variable which represents the cumulation of past de￿cit. Risk premia arise when investors
foresee a future unsustainable path for public debt; that is, they fear that the sovereign will
not be able to repay interests given its expected path of future revenues. In fact, a sovereign
may be able to repay interests on the current cumulated stock of debt, but may be suddenly
perceived to be unable to pay interests on future expected debt. Therefore, it is important
to look at expected variation in the stock of debt, and in particular, on the e⁄ort required
(in terms of future revenue) to repay the future debt. As the latest crisis has shown, risk
premia may not be necessarily related to the level of public debt. Ireland and Spain started
in fact from a very low level of debt, but what seemed to matter for investors were their
expectations about the ability of these countries to ￿nance future debt, given that they both
su⁄ered from huge adverse e⁄ects of asset price collapse. To sketch the idea, in the appendix
we provide a simple formalization on how this variable is related to risk premia.
In Table 13 we show the results obtained when interacting our three measures of ￿scal
policy with the dummy crisis.
[Table 13 here]
We split the columns so that in columns 1 and 3 we use the dummy which has been
constructed from the database of Laeven and Valencia (2008), while in columns 2 and 4 we
use a dummy that includes only the latest crisis. The results show that the level of debt fails
to explain risk premia, while de￿cit is signi￿cant only in the latest crisis. What we observe
instead is that the de￿cit gap explains signi￿cantly risk premia: a one standard deviation
increase in the de￿cit gap (whose standard deviation is around 4 in the sample) leads to an
increase in the slope by about 30 basis points in times of crisis. Moreover, we show that this
result is not only a characteristic of the latest crisis; in fact, when we include also previous
episodes of ￿nancial crises we ￿nd equivalent e⁄ects.
236 Fiscal Policy Spillovers
The results so far point at small e⁄ects of idiosyncratic ￿scal factors in the determination
of interest rates. In this section we therefore analyze quantitatively the importance of com-
mon factors. In particular, we will concentrate on how shocks to the aggregate ￿scal stance
transmit to domestic interest rates, e.g. we quantify the e⁄ects of ￿scal policy spillovers. As
economies become more integrated economically and ￿nancially, domestic ￿scal policy tends
to lose importance in explaining interest rates. However, changes in the world ￿scal stance,
by a⁄ecting the world savings schedule and thus the equilibrium world interest rate, will
still a⁄ect the level of the domestic interest rate. The literature has already recognized the
importance of these e⁄ects. Faini (2006) for example, analyzes the extent of ￿scal spillovers
for the EMU, a deeply integrated economic area. Ardagna et al. (2007) consider the im-
portance of ￿scal spillovers in the OECD. Recently, Claeys et al. (2008) analyze the e⁄ects
of spillovers in a panel of 100 countries. In all cases, the quanti￿ed e⁄ects are economically
strong and statistically signi￿cant, with ￿scal spillovers dominating quantitatively domestic
crowding-out e⁄ects14.
One important issue arising from the estimation of ￿scal policy spillovers is how to ap-
proximate the aggregate ￿scal stance. Our framework in this respect is particularly well
suited. Since the second common factor can be interpreted as the aggregate stance of ￿scal
policy in the OECD15, the country speci￿c coe¢ cients on this variable can be directly inter-
preted as the spillover e⁄ects. However, a ￿pure￿spillover measure would require to exclude
the own ￿scal stance from the average. As such, to check the robustness of our results, we
14Faini (2006) ￿nds that while domestic policy bears an e⁄ect on interest rates, these are rather small
compared to the spillover e⁄ects: a change in domestic surplus leads to a 5 basis points reduction of interest
rates, while a change in the EMU surplus leads to a 41 basis points decrease in interest rates. Ardagna et
al. (2007) obtain similar results for the OECD. They analyze the world ￿scal stance as both the aggregate
primary de￿cit and the aggregate debt. They ￿nd that, depending on the speci￿cation, the world de￿cit leads
to increase in interest rates between 28 and 66 basis points, while world debt increases interest rates between
3 and 21 basis points. In both papers, the coe¢ cients for spillovers are homogeneous across countries.
15The theory would suggest to use the « world » ￿scal stance as control. Here, we use instead the
average ￿scal stance in 17 advanced economies. We believe this provides a reasonable approximation (see
also Ardagna et al. (2007) on the point).
24will confront the coe¢ cients obtained using the average ￿scal de￿cit in the OECD, with the
coe¢ cients estimated using the "corrected" average ￿scal de￿cit, which is the average ￿scal
de￿cit minus the own country de￿cit. To keep consistency with previous literature, we report
the results only for the real and nominal interest rate.
We report results in Table 14 and 15 and Figures 4 to 7. The vertical bars report the
estimated coe¢ cients. First, we notice that, in general, the magnitude of the coe¢ cients
estimated when using averages are bigger than those obtained when using corrected av-
erages. Beside the di⁄erences in magnitude though, the ranking of the coe¢ cients across
countries is the same, whathever the dependent variable and the measure of spillover used
is. Interastingly, there seems to be a clustering of countries, with Portugal, Ireland, Italy
and Spain16 displaying the highest coe¢ cients. For this group of countries, a one percentage
point increase in average "world" ￿scal de￿cit increases real interest rates between 35 and
45 basis points and nominal interest rates between 35 and 60 basis points. We see that a
positive spillover e⁄ects is also observed for a group of countries which includes the core
EMU members (Austria, Belgium, Netherlands, France), nordic countries (Finland, Den-
mark, Sweden), and anglosaxon (UK and Australia). For this group, however, the range of
coe¢ cients is between 10 and 25 basis points. The last group of countries is composed of
Japan, the US, Norway and Germany for which we do not observe spillover e⁄ects. This
are in fact countries that are relatively "large" (US, Japan and Germany), or for which the
windfall revenues of oil production is quite unique (Norway).
We then checked whether the cross sectional dispersion of the spillover coe¢ cients can
also be related to indicators of ￿nancial integration. We choose two measures of ￿nancial in-
tegration: the beginning of period de jure openness measured with the Quinn index (Quinn,
1997), and beginning of period interest rates, which are a de facto measure of ￿nancial inte-
gration. Figures 8 to 11 plot the estimated spillover coe¢ cients against these two alternative
measures. These scatterplots want to gauge how and if countries￿heterogeneous response
16Ironically dubbed the PIIGS by the media.
25to aggregate savings can be explained by an initially lower level of ￿nancial integration
compared to the rest of the sample.
[Figures 8 to 11]
We can see that the spillover coe¢ cients for the real and for the nominal interest rate
seem indeed correlated with initial conditions, although the correlation seem stronger when
we use a de facto measure. In both cases, the ￿t seems higher for the regression using the
nominal rate as dependent variable.
These results then provide us with a novel interpretation for the heterogeneity of the
transmission of ￿scal shocks to interest rates. The common trend of ￿scal consolidation
observed between 1992 and 2000 has increased aggregate savings and contributed to the
reduction of interest rates. In turn, this reduction of interest rates - which for some countries
has been facilitated by the entry in the EMU - has created a stronger convergence in interest
rates for countries initially less ￿nancially integrated. While this strong convergence of
interest rates and this deeper integration has seemed bene￿cial, it has led to other sources
of vulnerability, namely higher current account de￿cits and housing bubbles (Giavazzi and
Spaventa, 2010). The aggregate ￿scal shock that was generated by the need to increase
spending to rescue ailing ￿nancial institutions coupled with the revenue losses due to the
global recession, reduced the global supply of savings pushing up interest rates. However,
countries normally considered "safe heavens" (the US, Germany and the UK, for example),
saw their yields go down, while for the other countries, investors started to di⁄erentiate in
terms of domestic vulnerabilities, and in particular, in terms of the capacity to generate
future revenues, severly impaired by the severe e⁄ects of the recession.
7 Robustness Checks
In this section we report the results from some robustness check aimed at validating our
results. The ￿rst check consists in replacing the factors estimated from principal components
26with their economic interpretation. That is, we replicate the results in Table 5,6,7 from the
FAP, with and without the crisis, but instead of the estimated factors we use: the average
de￿cit in the sample and the average short term interest rate when we use the nominal and
real interest rate as dependent variables; the average de￿cit and the average public debt
when we use the slope as dependent variable. The results are reported in Table 14. Columns
1 and 2 refer to the real interest rate, columns 3 and 4 refer to the nominal interest rate and
columns 5 and 6 refer to the slope.
[Table 16 here]
This table shows that the main results are robust once we replace the interpretation of the
factors. There is no signi￿cant change in the magnitude of the coe¢ cients. There are some
minor changes in the signi￿cance of the ￿scal variables. For example, in the speci￿cation of
the real interest rate, the public de￿cit is signi￿cant also once we exclude the crisis. When
instead the dependent variable is the nominal interest rate, the de￿cit becomes signi￿cant
only when including the crisis. Finally, when we use the slope as regressor, the public debt
becomes signi￿cant. Overall, we conclude that the minor e⁄ect of replacing the factors with
their observed counterparts is seen on the standard errors, rather than on the coe¢ cients.
The second robustness check we perform is a cross-validation. We check whether results
are con￿rmed once we exclude one country at a time from the panel. The results are reported
in Table 17, 18 and 19. There is no signi￿cant change in the value of the coe¢ cients across
each column. The only relevant change we ￿nd is that the public debt becomes signi￿cant
in the speci￿cation for the slope once we exclude Japan. We also perform rolling regression
to check whether there is any time variation in the coe¢ cients of ￿scal policy. Our ￿ndings
are reported in Figures 12 to 14. Over the sample, the primary de￿cit remains insigni￿cant
trhoughout, with the minor exception of the speci￿cation for the real interest rate. We
see that the de￿cit becomes signi￿cant in the period between 2007-2008, but insigni￿cant
thereafter. More interesting is the dynamic behaviour of the coe¢ cient on public debt.
Irrespectively of the dependent variable used, the magnitude of the coe¢ cient falls across
27time. There is an especially marked reduction when the dependent variable is the slope, for
which there seems to be a possible break in the relation after 2004.
A third robustness check is to include the current account over GDP among the regressors.
In a ￿rst step, we ￿rst check that the inclusions of the new regressor does not a⁄ect the
behaviour of the extracted principal components, which is indeed the case. We then run the
regressions including the current account among the regressors and the results are reported
in Table 20.
[Table 20 here]
The results show that the current account is not signi￿cantly correlated with interest
rates, and its inclusion does not a⁄ect the main results. A fourth robustness check is to
include a third factor in the estimation and in adopting the Pesaran￿ s Pooled Common
Correlated E⁄ects (CEEP) estimator. We report in Table 21 only the results from the
CCEP since in the 3 factors panel model, the country speci￿c coe¢ cients on the third factor
were statistically insigni￿cant and did not a⁄ect the results.
[Table 21 here]
Overall, we ￿nd no di⁄erence between techniques. The CCEP yield virtually the same
results, both in terms of magnitude of the coe¢ cients and sign￿cance of the explanatory
variables. This is not surprising given that the two factors in the FAP are interpreted as
cross section averages and, overall, the ￿rst two factors explain a substantial fraction of panel
variance.
A ￿nal robustness check is to split the issues between June and December issues. The
main results17 are not changed.
17Not reported, but available upon request.
288 Concluding remarks
In this paper we tackled the issue of identifying the e⁄ects of ￿scal policy on interest rates
for a panel of 17 OECD countries. We use real time data on forecasts to limit issues of reverse
causality and to better take into account the forward looking nature of the responses of
￿nancial markets. To appropriately consider the cross sectional dependence across countries￿
interest rates we use a factor augmented panel (FAP) as in Giannone Lenza (2010).
This methodology on one hand allows us to obtain consistent and unbiased estimates,
and on the other it allows us to show that two main underlying factors can explain more
than 60% of the variance in the data. We identi￿ed these factors to be the global monetary
and ￿scal policy stance. Once we take into account these global factors, the importance of
the domestic ￿scal policy variables is signi￿cantly reduced. However our results show that
public debt is still a signi￿cant determinant of both real and nominal interest rates, although
contributing by a modest 1 to 2 basis points. We ￿nd also, contrary to previous ￿nding, that
the non-linear e⁄ect of ￿scal policy stems from the expected de￿cit rather than the public
debt. In accordance with the theoretical models of ￿scal policy in open economy, we ￿nd
that global ￿scal stance plays a relevant role in a⁄ecting interest rates. In particular, we
show that the externalities caused by global ￿scal expansion are by far quantitatively more
important than domestic factors, with a signi￿cant heterogeneity in the propagation of the
common ￿scal shock across countries. The magnitude of these spillover e⁄ects ranges between
zero and 42 basis points for the real interest rate and between 3 and 48 for nominal interst
rate. Moreover the e⁄ects appear to be stronger for countries characterized by domestic
vulnerabilities and that were relatively less ￿nancially integrated at the beginning of the
sample. Interestingly these latter results are robust to the exclusion of the latest ￿nancial
crisis.
The results show us that in open economy, a pro￿ igate ￿scal policy does not translate
directly into higher borrowing costs when the stimulus is country speci￿c. Hence, as interest
rates are determined on the world markets, free riding on other countries￿￿scal discipline is
29indeed feasible, but can be dangerous and short lived. In fact, ￿scal pro￿ igacy ultimately
leads to a build up of public debt which still has positive e⁄ect on interest rates. Moreover,
the size of expected de￿cit might still impact signi￿cantly interest rates through risk premia.
More importantly, when the ￿scal shock is common, as in the latest crisis, this leads to
an adjustment in all yields, with signi￿cant heteorgeneity in the e⁄ects across countries.
Speci￿cally, while weaker countries do indeed face the prospect of higher ￿nancing cost,
countries normally considered "safe havens" see their yields go down (￿ ight-to-quality).
Finally, the fact that these spillover e⁄ects do not seem to be related to domestic public
debt or current ￿scal pro￿ igacy can lead to a more general reassessment of the usefulness of
quantitative caps on ￿scal variables as embodied in the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP).
In fact, as our paper shows, the level of interest rate is endogenous to higher capital market
integration and, while ￿scal indiscipline is not directly re￿ ected into higher costs of borrow-
ing, it is important to monitor other macroeconomic aspects that higher ￿nancial integration
might transform into vulnerabilities. These include for example, competitiveness, relative
productivity, credit and leverage, and - as we show - current account imbalances (Giavazzi
and Spaventa, 2010). An in depth analysis of the relative importance of these factors in
determining the sensitivity to spillovers is an issue we leave for future research.
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349 APPENDIX A
9.1 Factor extraction and interpretation
The aim of this section is to show the results from principal component analysis. Since
we have three di⁄erent dependent variables, we do principal components on three di⁄erent
matrices: we keep the same set of controls while we allow the dependent to di⁄er in each
case.








rltyt inf lt stnrt pdeft debtt gt
￿
where - as mentioned in the paper - rltyt measures the real interest rate, stnrt the expected
short term rate, inf lt is the expected in￿ ation rate, pdeft the expected primary de￿cit and
debtt and gt are measures of expected public debt and expected real GDP growth respectively.
When we look at the ￿scal determinants of the long run nominal interest rate we use the







nltyt inf lt stnrt pdeft debtt gt
￿








slopet inf lt stnrt pdeft debtt gt
￿
An important point in our analysis is the determination of the number of factors to extract
and to include in the panel regression. In the empirical literature on factor models, the
determination of the number of factors has been a subject of intense research. For example
35Forni and Riechlin (1998) propose a rule of thumb according to which one should retain the
number of principal components that explains more than a certain fraction of the variance,
while Bai and Ng (2002) present a formal test based on information criteria. In our case
Table 1 shows that in general the ￿rst two components explain more than 60% of the variance
of the panel and the marginal contribution of the third factor is below 10%. Therefore we
decide to take into consideration only the ￿rst two factors.
[Table 1 here]
Such high portion of explained variance mean that the cross sectional correlation is indeed
relevant in explaining the behaviour of our dependent variables, and it points towards the
presence of a small number of global shocks.
Despite being conceptually appealing and easy to implement, this methodology has an
important drawback which is that factors not always have a clear interpretation.
To ￿nd the interpretation of the factors we let ourselves guide by economic intuition.
It is plausible to think of the global factors driving the interest rates as being related to
global monetary and ￿scal policy or global economic cycle. In general this intuition is well
supported by the data in all of the three cases we analyze.
In the ￿rst case, when we analyze the determinants of the real interest rate, we can see
that the average of the short term interest rate of the countries in the sample and the average
de￿cit are very much correlated with the ￿rst and the second factor respectively.
Figure 1 shows the path of the two variables plotted against the two extracted factors.
Given that the extracted factors are standardized to have mean zero, we standardize the
short term interest rates and the de￿cits before computing the averages. From the ￿gure we
can see that these aggregate values track very closely the two extracted factors, therefore
supporting the idea that the major global shocks that drive the comovement of the real
interest rates come from the aggregate monetary and the ￿scal policy stance.
[Figure 15 here]
36To give quantitative support to our interpretation, we then try to regress our estimated
factors on the average short term rate and on the average de￿cit respectively. Table 2 reports
the results of this exercise. We can see that in both cases the constant term is very close
to zero and never signi￿cant, while the coe¢ cient on the estimated factor is pretty close to
one. Moreover the R2 indicates a very good ￿t.
[Table 22 here]:
Even in the second case, when we look at the determinants of the long term interest
rates, the interpretation of the two global factors remains unchanged. Figure 2 shows that
also in this case the average short term interest rate and the average de￿cit track very well
the dynamics of the extracted factors.
[Figure 16 here]
Again, by regressing our extracted factors on the sample averages of short term rate and
de￿cit (Table 3) we obtain a very good ￿t, with coe¢ cients on the factors very close to one
and coe¢ cients on the constant term being basically zero.
[Table 23 here]
Finally, when we extract the common factors for the slope of the yield curve, we ￿nd
that the two factors seem to be best approximated by the average debt to GDP ratio and
by the average de￿cit. This indicates that the global ￿scal stance has an impact on a proxy
for risk premia. Table 4 reports the results from the regression of average debt and average
de￿cit on the factors.
[Table 24 here]
We can notice that with respect to the previous cases, the ￿t worsens slightly. This can
be related to the fact that, as reported in Table 1, the common factors seem to explain less
37of the slopes of the yield curves for the countries in our sample, leaving more room for the
idiosyncratic components. Therefore the extracted common factors can be related to global
aggregates with less precision than in the previous cases.
To conclude, Figure 3 shows the ￿rst and the second extracted factors plotted against
the average of the debt to GDP and the average de￿cit.
[Figure 17 here]
9.2 De￿cit Gap and Risk premia
Imagine that a risk neutral investor prices the interest rate according to the following
condition
r(1 ￿ p) = r
￿
where r is the domestic interest rate, p is the probability of default and r￿ is a benchmark
rate. The default probability will determine the possible size of the risk premium, and will
be related to the de￿cit gap in the following way:
p = p1 if gbal
￿ ￿ gbal < k
p = p2 if gbal
￿ ￿ gbal > k
with p1 < p2 and where gbal￿ is the government balance that stabilizes the debt to GDP
ratio and gbal is the actual government balance. So if the required adjustment is perceived
as large, there will be risk premia, while it will not a⁄ect interest rates if the de￿cit needed to




nltr Long term nominal interest rate Datastream
rltr The ex-ante real interest rate. It is constructed as: nltr ￿ Et+10(inf) Datastream,
where Et+10(inf) is extrapolated with a Kalman Filter applied to Et+1(inf ) OECD
slope Long term nominal interest rate minus the short (3-month) nominal interest rate Datastream
str One year ahead short term (3-Month) interest rate. OECD
inf One year ahead GDP de￿ ator in￿ ation rate (ln(PGDP t+1=PGDP t)) OECD
g One year ahead Growth rate of Real GDP OECD
pdef Government lending net of interest payments (NLG+YPEPG) OECD
debt Gross Government Financial Liabilities (GGFL) OECD
spend Primary government spending (YPG-YPEPG) OECD




￿=(rltr ￿ g)debt, and gbal = ￿pdef
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
  Rint Ltr  Slope  Int  Rate GDP   Inflation  Def/GDP(-1)  Debt/GDP(-1) G/GDP(-1)  T/GDP(-1) 
               Growth                
mean 3.5  5.9  1  4.9  2.4  2.5  -2.9  70  44.6  45 
sd 1.8  2.3  1.5  2.6  1  1.1  3.8  29.1  7.2  7.5 
min 0  0.8 -14.8  0  -1.9  -0.7  -20.2  12.1  23.2  29.2 
max 9.1 14.5  4.4  15.4  7.5  8.9  11  199.8  68.2  63.2 




Table 2: Principal Component Analysis 






Real Int. Rate  Marginal  0.4702  0.1922  0.0962  0.0533  0.0356 
 Cumulative  0.4702  0.6624  0.7585  0.8118  0.8474 
Long Term Int. Rate  Marginal  0.5001  0.1645  0.0881  0.0543  0.0366 
 Cumulative  0.5001  0.6647  0.7528  0.8070  0.8436 
Slope Marginal  0.4201  0.1877  0.0982  0.0787  0.0404 
 Cumulative  0.4201  0.6078  0.7060  0.7847  0.8251 
The table reports the marginal and cumulative proportions of the explained variance by the first 5 principal 







Table 3: CSD Tests 
Variable CD-test  p-value  corr  abs(corr) 
      
Rint  72.22 0.000 0.886 0.886 
Ltr  74.16 0.000 0.948 0.948 
Slope  41.26 0.000 0.51  0.516 
Int  Rate  -  Short  67.93 0.000 0.867 0.867 
Inflation  43.21 0.000 0.55  0.555 
Growth  36.22 0.000 0.464 0.464 
Def/GDP(-1)  43.04 0.000 0.552 0.58 
Debt/GDP(-1)  20.53 0.000 0.264 0.411 
G/GDP(-1)  29.25 0.000 0.36  0.438 
T/GDP(-1)  8.15  0.000 0.101 0.271 
Notes: Under the null hypothesis of cross-section independence 
CD ~ N(0,1)  
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Table 4: Panel Unit Root Tests 
  0 lag  1 lag  2 lags     
    CIPS p-val CIPS p-val CIPS p-val MP  p-val 
Rint  -3.97 0.00  -2.51 0.01  -1.10 0.13  -3.13  0.001 
Ltr  -5.31 0.00  -3.40 0.00  -2.94 0.00  -3.515  0.000 
Slope  -5.88 0.00  -4.39 0.00  -3.59 0.00  -5.643  0.000 
Int  Rate  -  Short  -5.12 0.00  -2.72 0.00  -2.21 0.01  -3.137  0.001 
Inflation  -5.40 0.00  -3.52 0.00  -1.98 0.02  -4.878  0.000 
GDP  Growth  -9.81 0.00  -4.59 0.00  -4.21 0.00  -14.49  0.000 
Def/GDP(-1)  -1.16  0.12 0.97 0.83 1.28 0.90 -1.81  0.035 
Debt/GDP(-1)  0.60 0.72 1.60 0.94 1.96 0.97 -1.867 0.031 
G/GDP(-1)  -0.85  0.20 -0.02  0.49 0.58 0.72 -3.963 0.000 
T/GDP(-1)  -2.16 0.02  -1.04 0.15  -0.41 0.34  -6.034  0.000 
Notes: CIPS is the t-test for unit roots in heterogenous panels with cross-section 
dependence, proposed by Pesaran (2007). The lag refers to the order of the ADF 
regression. Null hypothesis assumes that all series are non-stationary. MP is the Moon and 
Perron (2004) panel unit root test based on two extracted factors from the variable. The lag 






































Table 5: Baseline estimation, Real interest rate 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
RINT  All Sample  All Sample  All Sample  No Crisis  No Crisis  No Crisis 
                    
Int  Rate  -  Short 0.699*** 0.554*** 0.398*** 0.690*** 0.580*** 0.393*** 
  [0.031] [0.047] [0.037] [0.030] [0.047] [0.037] 
GDP  Growth  0.180** 0.005  0.103*  0.333***  0.105** 0.098 
  [0.064] [0.061] [0.054] [0.077] [0.050] [0.056] 
Inflation -0.294***  -0.294***  -0.210**  -0.212*** -0.228*** -0.197*** 
  [0.088] [0.075] [0.075] [0.071] [0.069] [0.061] 
Def/GDP(-1)  0.111*** 0.071*** 0.044*** 0.094*** 0.058***  0.036* 
  [0.014] [0.012] [0.014] [0.014] [0.011] [0.018] 
Debt/GDP(-1)  0.017**  0.009*** 0.011*** 0.023*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 
  [0.007] [0.002] [0.003] [0.007] [0.002] [0.004] 
        
Observations 709 709 709 624 624 624 
R-squared  0.810 0.936 0.959 0.824 0.943 0.963 
Number  of  id  17 17 17 17 17 17 
CSD  44.57 -4.22 -3.45 41.89 -4.15 -3.43 
CIPS-Error  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Country  FE  yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Time  FE  no yes yes no yes yes 
Factors  no no yes no no yes 
Robust standard errors in brackets         
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1         
The dependent variable is the ex-ante real interest rate. The independent variables are: expected short 
term interest rate; expected GDP growth; expected Inflation; expected deficit as a share of current period 
GDP; expected gross debt as a share of current period GDP. CSD is the Pesaran’s (2004) statistic to 
detect cross-sectional dependence; the statistic is distributed as a normal under the null of cross-sectional 
independence; "CIPS-error" reports the p-value from the Pesaran’s (2007) test to detect unit root in the 
residual; null hypothesis assumes that all series in the panel are non-stationary. Columns 1 and 4 report 
the results from the FE; Columns 2 and 4 report the results from the 2FE; Columns 3 and 6 report the 
results from the FAP. Columns 1-3 include in the sample years 2008 and 2009; Columns 3-6 exclude 




















Table 6: Baseline estimation, Long term interest rate 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
LTR  All Sample  All Sample  All Sample  No Crisis  No Crisis  No Crisis 
                    
Int  Rate  -  Short 0.770*** 0.607*** 0.397*** 0.763*** 0.616*** 0.381*** 
  [0.032] [0.057] [0.035] [0.035] [0.060] [0.039] 
GDP  Growth  0.221*** 0.023  0.100*  0.350*** 0.087  0.083 
  [0.075] [0.068] [0.050] [0.102] [0.071] [0.062] 
Inflation  0.187**  0.151** 0.078  0.252***  0.195** 0.079 
  [0.078] [0.069] [0.046] [0.078] [0.077] [0.047] 
Def/GDP(-1) 0.126***  0.061***  0.016  0.111***  0.053** 0.012 
  [0.017] [0.019] [0.013] [0.018] [0.019] [0.019] 
Debt/GDP(-1)  0.015*  0.004**  0.008***  0.019** 0.006** 0.009** 
  [0.008] [0.002] [0.002] [0.008] [0.002] [0.003] 
        
Observations 709 709 709 624 624 624 
R-squared  0.853 0.958 0.979 0.857 0.958 0.980 
Number  of  id  17 17 17 17 17 17 
CSD  46.45 -3.58 -3.53 42.22 -3.37 -3.29 
CIPS-Error  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Country  FE  yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Time  FE  no yes yes no yes yes 
Factors  no no yes no no yes 
Robust standard errors in brackets         
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1         
The dependent variable is the nominal long terml interest rate. The independent variables are: expected 
short term interest rate; expected GDP growth; expected Inflation; expected deficit as a share of current 
period GDP; expected gross debt as a share of current period GDP. CSD is the Pesaran’s (2004) statistic 
to detect cross-sectional dependence; the statistic is distributed as a normal under the null of cross-
sectional independence; "CIPS-error" reports the p-value from the Pesaran’s (2007) test to detect unit 
root in the residual; null hypothesis assumes that all series in the panel are non-stationary. Columns 1 and 
4 report the results from the FE; Columns 2 and 4 report the results from the 2FE; Columns 3 and 6 
report the results from the FAP. Columns 1-3 include in the sample years 2008 and 2009; Columns 3-6 




















Table 7: Baseline estimation, Slope of yield curve 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
SLOPE  All Sample  All Sample  All Sample  No Crisis  No Crisis  No Crisis 
                    
Int Rate - Short  -0.341***  -0.507***  -0.652*** -0.350*** -0.499*** -0.717*** 
  [0.026] [0.077] [0.086] [0.027] [0.084] [0.098] 
GDP  Growth  0.387***  0.180*  0.360** 0.556***  0.306*** 0.299** 
  [0.088] [0.093] [0.124] [0.094] [0.099] [0.114] 
Inflation 0.135  0.183**  0.146  0.244**  0.275***  0.173 
  [0.108] [0.079] [0.095] [0.103] [0.085] [0.109] 
Def/GDP(-1)  0.088***  0.045 -0.016 0.042 0.033 -0.048 
  [0.030] [0.039] [0.033] [0.026] [0.037] [0.032] 
Debt/GDP(-1) 0.009 -0.001 0.005 0.012* 0.002 0.007 
  [0.008] [0.003] [0.003] [0.006] [0.003] [0.004] 
        
Observations 714 714 714 629 629 629 
R-squared  0.396 0.679 0.735 0.395 0.658 0.721 
Number  of  id  17 17 17 17 17 17 
CSD  34.97 -2.98 -2.63 30.79 -2.86 -2.21 
CIPS-Error  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Country  FE  yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Time  FE  no yes yes no yes yes 
Factors  no no yes no no yes 
Robust standard errors in brackets         
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1         
The dependent variable is the slope. The independent variables are: expected short term interest rate; 
expected GDP growth; expected Inflation; expected deficit as a share of current period GDP; expected 
gross debt as a share of current period GDP. CSD is the Pesaran’s (2004) statistic to detect cross-
sectional dependence; the statistic is distributed as a normal under the null of cross-sectional 
independence; "CIPS-error" reports the p-value from the Pesaran’s (2007) test to detect unit root in the 
residual; null hypothesis assumes that all series in the panel are non-stationary. Columns 1 and 4 report 
the results from the FE; Columns 2 and 4 report the results from the 2FE; Columns 3 and 6 report the 
results from the FAP. Columns 1-3 include in the sample years 2008 and 2009; Columns 3-6 exclude 




















Table 8: Non Linearities with the debt level 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5)  (6) 
RINT  All Sample  All Sample  All Sample  No Crisis  No Crisis  No Crisis 
                    
Int Rate - Short  0.399***  0.397***  0.400***  0.395***  0.392***  0.394*** 
 [0.038]  [0.037]  [0.037]  [0.038] [0.037]  [0.038] 
GDP Growth  0.098*  0.104*  0.103*  0.083  0.098*  0.091 
 [0.055]  [0.053]  [0.056]  [0.059] [0.056]  [0.060] 
Inflation -0.204**  -0.210**  -0.214** -0.189***  -0.196*** -0.199*** 
 [0.070]  [0.076]  [0.076]  [0.057] [0.062]  [0.063] 
Def/GDP(-1) 0.044***  0.044***  0.044***  0.035*  0.036  0.036* 
 [0.014]  [0.014]  [0.013]  [0.020] [0.021]  [0.019] 
Debt/GDP(-1) 0.018**      0.026**     
 [0.008]      [0.010]     
(Debt/(GDP(-1))
2 -0.000      -0.001     
 [0.000]      [0.000]     
Debt/(GDP(-1) < Median    0.011***      0.012***   
   [0.003]      [0.004]   
Debt/GDP(-1) > Median    0.011***      0.013***   
   [0.003]      [0.004]   
Debt/GDP(-1) < 75%      0.009***      0.010*** 
     [0.003]      [0.003] 
Debt/GDP(-1) > 75%      0.011***      0.014*** 
     [0.003]      [0.004] 
            
Observations 709  709  709  624  624  624 
R-squared 0.959  0.959  0.959  0.964  0.963  0.964 
Number of id  17  17  17  17  17  17 
CSD -3.47  -3.49  -3.42 -3.48 -3.49 -3.37 
CIPS-Error 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Country FE  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Time FE  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Factors yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Robust standard errors in brackets 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
The dependent variable is the ex-ante real interest rate. The independent variables are: expected short term interest rate; 
expected GDP growth; expected Inflation; expected deficit as a share of current period GDP; expected gross debt as a share 
of current period GDP. We tested different non linearities with respect to public debt: in columns 1 and 4 we introduced 
debt squared; in columns 2 and 5 we splined the debt variable according to weather the debt to GDP is lower or higher than 
the median of the entire sample; in columns 3 and 6 we splined the debt variable according to weather debt to GDP is lower 
or higher than the 3
rd quartile of the entire sample. CSD is the Pesaran’s (2004) statistic to detect cross-sectional 
dependence; the statistic is distributed as a normal under the null of cross-sectional independence; "CIPS-error" reports the 
p-value from the Pesaran’s (2007) test to detect unit root in the residual; null hypothesis assumes that all series in the panel 
are non-stationary. Columns 1 and 4 report the results from the FE; Columns 2 and 4 report the results from the 2FE; 
Columns 3 and 6 report the results from the FAP. Columns 1-3 include in the sample years 2008 and 2009; Columns 3-6 









Table 9: Non Linearities with the debt level 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5)  (6) 
LTR  All Sample  All Sample  All Sample  No Crisis  No Crisis  No Crisis 
                    
Int Rate - Short  0.396***  0.396***  0.399***  0.381***  0.379***  0.383*** 
  [0.034] [0.034] [0.034]  [0.038] [0.038]  [0.038] 
GDP  Growth  0.101* 0.101* 0.100* 0.082 0.084  0.078 
  [0.050] [0.049] [0.051]  [0.063] [0.061]  [0.064] 
Inflation  0.076 0.078 0.075  0.080  0.081  0.077 
  [0.048] [0.047] [0.046]  [0.048] [0.048]  [0.045] 
Def/GDP(-1)  0.016 0.016 0.016  0.012  0.012  0.013 
  [0.013] [0.013] [0.012]  [0.018] [0.018]  [0.017] 
Debt/GDP(-1) 0.006      0.010     
 [0.006]      [0.009]     
(Debt/(GDP(-1))
2 0.000      -0.000     
 [0.000]      [0.000]     
Debt/GDP(-1) < Median    0.007**      0.008**   
   [0.003]     [0.003]   
Debt/GDP(-1)  >  Median   0.008***     0.009***   
   [0.002]     [0.003]   
Debt/GDP(-1) < 75%      0.006***      0.006** 
     [0.002]      [0.003] 
Debt/GDP(-1) > 75%      0.008***      0.009*** 
     [0.002]      [0.003] 
           
Observations  709 709 709  624  624  624 
R-squared  0.979 0.979 0.979  0.980  0.980  0.980 
Number  of  id  17 17 17  17  17  17 
CSD  -3.53 -3.55 -3.52 -3.29  -3.34  -3.28 
CIPS-Error  0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Country  FE  yes yes yes  yes  yes  yes 
Time  FE  yes yes yes  yes  yes  yes 
Factors  yes yes yes  yes  yes  yes 
Robust standard errors in brackets         
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1         
The dependent variable is the nominal long terml interest rate. The independent variables are: expected short term interest 
rate; expected GDP growth; expected Inflation; expected deficit as a share of current period GDP; expected gross debt as a 
share of current period GDP. We tested different non linearities with respect to public debt: in columns 1 and 4 we 
introduced debt squared; in columns 2 and 5 we splined the debt variable according to weather the debt to GDP is lower or 
higher than the median of the entire sample; in columns 3 and 6 we splined the debt variable according to weather debt to 
GDP is lower or higher than the 3
rd quartile of the entire sample. CSD is the Pesaran’s (2004) statistic to detect cross-
sectional dependence; the statistic is distributed as a normal under the null of cross-sectional independence; "CIPS-error" 
reports the p-value from the Pesaran’s (2007) test to detect unit root in the residual; null hypothesis assumes that all series 
in the panel are non-stationary. Columns 1 and 4 report the results from the FE; Columns 2 and 4 report the results from 
the 2FE; Columns 3 and 6 report the results from the FAP. Columns 1-3 include in the sample years 2008 and 2009; 









Table 10: Non Linearities with the debt level 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5)  (6) 
SLOPE  All Sample  All Sample  All Sample  No Crisis  No Crisis  No Crisis 
                    
Int Rate - Short  -0.649***  -0.653***  -0.655***  -0.712*** -0.722*** -0.720*** 
  [0.086] [0.085] [0.086]  [0.100] [0.097] [0.097] 
GDP  Growth  0.353** 0.361** 0.358**  0.288**  0.300**  0.302** 
  [0.125] [0.125] [0.126]  [0.113] [0.115] [0.114] 
Inflation  0.157 0.149 0.150  0.183  0.178  0.176 
  [0.093] [0.094] [0.095]  [0.108] [0.108] [0.109] 
Def/GDP(-1)  -0.015 -0.016 -0.017  -0.047 -0.048 -0.049 
  [0.031] [0.033] [0.032]  [0.030] [0.031] [0.032] 
Debt/GDP(-1) 0.015      0.020     
 [0.009]      [0.012]     
(Debt/(GDP(-1))
2 -0.001      -0.001     
 [0.000]      [0.001]     
Debt/GDP(-1)  <  Median   0.003     0.003   
   [0.005]     [0.005]   
Debt/GDP(-1)  >  Median   0.005     0.006   
   [0.003]     [0.004]   
Debt/GDP(-1) < 75%      0.008**      0.010** 
     [0.004]      [0.004] 
Debt/GDP(-1) > 75%      0.005      0.007 
     [0.003]      [0.004] 
           
Observations  714 714 714  629  629  629 
R-squared  0.736 0.735 0.736  0.722  0.722  0.722 
Number  of  id  17 17 17  17  17  17 
CSD  -2.50 -2.64 -2.59  -2.06 -2.22 -2.16 
CIPS-Error  0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Country  FE  yes yes yes  yes  yes  yes 
Time  FE  yes yes yes  yes  yes  yes 
Factors  yes yes yes  yes  yes  yes 
Robust standard errors in brackets         
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1         
The dependent variable is the slope. The independent variables are: expected short term interest rate; expected GDP 
growth; expected Inflation; expected deficit as a share of current period GDP; expected gross debt as a share of current 
period GDP. We tested different non linearities with respect to public debt: in columns 1 and 4 we introduced debt 
squared; in columns 2 and 5 we splined the debt variable according to weather the debt to GDP is lower or higher than 
the median of the entire sample; in columns 3 and 6 we splined the debt variable according to weather debt to GDP is 
lower or higher than the 3
rd quartile of the entire sample. CSD is the Pesaran’s (2004) statistic to detect cross-sectional 
dependence; the statistic is distributed as a normal under the null of cross-sectional independence; "CIPS-error" 
reports the p-value from the Pesaran’s (2007) test to detect unit root in the residual; null hypothesis assumes that all 
series in the panel are non-stationary. Columns 1 and 4 report the results from the FE; Columns 2 and 4 report the 
results from the 2FE; Columns 3 and 6 report the results from the FAP. Columns 1-3 include in the sample years 2008 









Table 11: Splitting the deficit 
  RINT LTR  SLOPE 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
  All Sample  No Crisis  All Sample  No Crisis  All Sample  No Crisis 
                    
Int Rate - Short  0.388***  0.383***  0.393***  0.378***  0.393***  -0.704*** 
 [0.035]  [0.037]  [0.035]  [0.039] [0.035] [0.101] 
GDP Growth  0.097*  0.090  0.097*  0.082  0.097*  0.319** 
 [0.052]  [0.054]  [0.048]  [0.061] [0.048] [0.116] 
Inflation -0.210***  -0.195***  0.075*  0.079*  0.075*  0.183 
 [0.071]  [0.056]  [0.043]  [0.044] [0.043] [0.117] 
G/GDP(-1) 0.041**  0.029*  0.012  0.011  0.012  -0.020 
 [0.014]  [0.016]  [0.014]  [0.016] [0.014] [0.054] 
T/GDP(-1) -0.053**  -0.043*  -0.015  -0.006  -0.015  0.07 
 [0.018]  [0.024]  [0.016]  [0.020] [0.016] [0.078] 
Debt/GDP(-1) 0.010***  0.013***  0.007***  0.009**  0.007*** 0.007 
 [0.003]  [0.004]  [0.002]  [0.003] [0.002] [0.005] 
          
Observations 709  624  709 624 714 629 
R-squared  0.959  0.963  0.979 0.980 0.979 0.724 
Number  of  id 17  17  17 17 17 17 
CSD  -3.54  -3.49  -3.52 -3.28 -3.52 -2.34 
CIPS-Error  0.00  0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Country  FE  yes  yes  yes yes yes yes 
Time  FE  yes  yes  yes yes yes yes 
Factors  yes  yes  yes yes yes yes 
Robust standard errors in brackets         
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1         
The dependent variable is the ex-ante real interest rate in Columns 1 and 2; the nominal long term 
interest rate in Columns 3 and 4; the slope in Columns 5 and 6.The independent variables in each 
column are: expected short term interest rate; expected GDP growth; expected Inflation; expected 
expenditure as a share of current period GDP; expected revenues as a share of current period GDP; 
expected gross debt as a share of current period GDP. CSD is the Pesaran’s (2004) statistic to detect 
cross-sectional dependence; the statistic is distributed as a normal under the null of cross-sectional 
independence; "CIPS-error" reports the p-value from the Pesaran’s (2007) test to detect unit root in the 
residual; null hypothesis assumes that all series in the panel are non-stationary. All Columns report the 
results from the FAP. Columns 1, 3, 5 include in the sample years 2008 and 2009; Columns 2,4, 6 
exclude them.   49
Table 12: Controlling for Structural Breaks with the Introduction of the Euro 
  RINT LTR  SLOPE 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
  All Sample  No Crisis  All Sample  No Crisis  All Sample  No Crisis 
                    
(Int Rate)*Emu  0.495***  0.401***  0.418***  0.347***  -0.473***  -0.632*** 
 [0.049]  [0.035]  [0.028]  [0.032] [0.081] [0.103] 
(Int Rate)*Non Emu  0.367***  0.379***  0.387***  0.377***  -0.669***  -0.723*** 
 [0.031]  [0.036]  [0.036]  [0.041] [0.086] [0.096] 
(Inflation)*Emu -0.422***  -0.314***  -0.015  0.029  0.051  0.091 
 [0.082]  [0.063]  [0.051]  [0.042] [0.106] [0.183] 
(Inflation)*Non Emu  -0.123**  -0.149***  0.105*  0.090*  0.169  0.171 
 [0.047]  [0.044]  [0.049]  [0.050] [0.107] [0.120] 
(Growth)*Emu 0.041  0.017  0.114*  0.090  0.448**  0.412*** 
 [0.069]  [0.113]  [0.061]  [0.085] [0.173] [0.137] 
(Growth)*Non Emu  0.096*  0.090  0.092  0.071  0.377***  0.314** 
 [0.051]  [0.057]  [0.053]  [0.064] [0.127] [0.125] 
(Def/GDP(-1))*Emu -0.010  -0.047  -0.009  -0.034  0.096**  0.022 
 [0.015]  [0.029]  [0.015]  [0.020] [0.039] [0.060] 
(Def/GDP(-1))*Non Emu  0.050***  0.041*  0.019  0.015  -0.032  -0.052 
 [0.016]  [0.021]  [0.015]  [0.019] [0.031] [0.031] 
(Debt/GDP(-1))*Emu 0.015***  0.018***  0.009***  0.011***  0.003  0.004 
 [0.003]  [0.003]  [0.002]  [0.003] [0.003] [0.005] 
(Debt/GDP(-1))*Non Emu  0.011***  0.014***  0.008***  0.010**  0.005  0.007 
 [0.003]  [0.004]  [0.003]  [0.004] [0.003] [0.004] 
            
Observations 709  624  709  624  714  629 
R-squared 0.962  0.965  0.979  0.980  0.740  0.722 
Number of id  17  17  17  17  17  17 
CSD -3.63  -3.55  -3.51  -3.31  -2.74  -2.30 
CIPS-Error 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Country FE  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Time FE  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Factors yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Robust standard errors in brackets         
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1         
The dependent variable is the ex-ante real interest rate in Columns 1 and 2; the nominal long term interest rate in 
Columns 3 and 4; the slope in Columns 5 and 6.The independent variables in each column are: expected short term 
interest rate; expected GDP growth; expected Inflation; expected deficit as a share of current period GDP; expected 
gross debt as a share of current period GDP. In this specification the variables enter interacted with two dummy 
variables: Emu (that takes value 1 for countries that belong to the EMU since the period of accession) and Non Emu 
(that takes value 1 in all other cases).  CSD is the Pesaran’s (2004) statistic to detect cross-sectional dependence; the 
statistic is distributed as a normal under the null of cross-sectional independence; "CIPS-error" reports the p-value 
from the Pesaran’s (2007) test to detect unit root in the residual; null hypothesis assumes that all series in the panel 
are non-stationary. All Columns report the results from the FAP. Columns 1, 3, 5 include in the sample years 2008 
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Table 13: Controlling for Non Linearities with Financial Crises 
  Deficit Gap Splined  Deficit Splined  Debt Splined 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
SLOPE  Lev. Val  2007 Crisis  Lev. Val  2007 Crisis  Lev. Val  2007 Crisis 
                    
Int Rate - Short  -0.522***  -0.516***  -0.519*** -0.518*** -0.527*** -0.523*** 
 [0.093]  [0.097]  [0.097]  [0.097] [0.094] [0.097] 
Inflation 0.011  0.013  0.002  0.002  0.019  0.015 
 [0.095]  [0.088]  [0.103]  [0.094] [0.092] [0.094] 
Growth 0.346***  0.352***  0.323***  0.321***  0.314***  0.312*** 
 [0.086]  [0.091]  [0.094]  [0.094] [0.099] [0.097] 
Debt/GDP(-1) 0.006*  0.007*  0.007*  0.007*     
 [0.003]  [0.004]  [0.004]  [0.004]     
NoCrisis*(Def Gap)  -0.010  0.007         
 [0.017]  [0.022]         
DCrisis*(Def Gap)  0.074**  0.069***         
 [0.030]  [0.021]         
Def/GDP(-1)         0.009  0.016 
         [0.019]  [0.021] 
NoCrisis*(Def/GDP(-1))     0.001  0.004     
     [0.019]  [0.025]     
DCrisis*(Def/GDP(-1))     0.064  0.068***     
     [0.038]  [0.022]     
NoCrisis*(Debt/GDP(-1))         0.007**  0.008* 
         [0.003]  [0.004] 
DCrisis*(Debt/GDP(-1))         0.010**  0.006** 
         [0.003]  [0.003] 
              
Observations 704  704  714  714  714  714 
R-squared 0.791  0.789  0.782  0.782  0.782  0.781 
Number of id  17  17  17  17  17  17 
CSD -3.11  -3.12  -3.57  -3.59  -3.67  -3.64 
CIPS-Error 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Test Spline  0.0362  0.00146  0.127  0.00288  0.0735  0.630 
Country FE  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Time FE  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Factors yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Robust standard errors in brackets         
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1         
The dependent variable is the slope. The independent variables in each column are: expected short term interest rate; 
expected GDP growth; expected Inflation; expected gross debt as a share of current period GDP; deficit gap 
computed as the sum of the expected surplus that would stabilize the debt to GDP ratio and the expected deficit as a 
share of current period GDP. We test a specification with a spline on the fiscal variables according to weather or not 
they are measured in a period of financial crisis. Specifically in columns 1, 3 and 5 the crisis periods are taken from 
the database of Laeven and Valencia (2008), while in columns 2,4 and 6 the crisis period corresponds only to the 
last financial crisis (from the second semester of 2007). In columns 1 and 2 we tested a spline on the deficit gap, 
wile in columns 3 and 4 we tested a spline on the deficit over current period GDP and in columns 5 and 6 we tested 
a spline on the level of debt over current period GDP. CSD is the Pesaran’s (2004) statistic to detect cross-sectional 
dependence; the statistic is distributed as a normal under the null of cross-sectional independence; "CIPS-error" 
reports the p-value from the Pesaran’s (2007) test to detect unit root in the residual; null hypothesis assumes that all 
series in the panel are non-stationary. “Test Spline” reports the p value of a t-test of equality between the two 
coefficients on the spline for each of the specifications. All Columns report the results from the FAP 
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Table 14: Spillovers from global fiscal stance, Real interest rates 
 
SPILLOVERS  Replacing factors  Replacing factors 
RINT  with averages  with corrected 
         averages 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  All No All No 
  Sample Crisis  Sample Crisis 
              
AUS  0.114* 0.106  0.117* 0.112 
  (0.066) (0.103) (0.066) (0.104) 
AUT  0.051 0.048 0.051 0.051 
  (0.054) (0.087) (0.054) (0.087) 
BEL  0.096* 0.113  0.097* 0.115 
  (0.056) (0.090) (0.056) (0.090) 
CAN  0.016 0.078 0.019 0.088 
  (0.067) (0.101) (0.069) (0.103) 
DEU  -0.022 0.017  -0.023 0.016 
  (0.054) (0.088) (0.054) (0.088) 
DNK  0.063 0.103 0.066 0.110 
  (0.058) (0.092) (0.058) (0.093) 
ESP  0.326*** 0.297*** 0.340*** 0.311*** 
  (0.076) (0.114) (0.079) (0.116) 
FIN  0.175*** 0.237**  0.187*** 0.258** 
  (0.064) (0.101) (0.066) (0.105) 
FRA  0.066 0.107 0.066 0.109 
  (0.053) (0.085) (0.052) (0.085) 
GBR  0.122* 0.154  0.127* 0.160 
  (0.065) (0.103) (0.067) (0.106) 
IRE  0.428*** 0.345*** 0.445*** 0.362*** 
  (0.082) (0.113) (0.085) (0.115) 
ITA  0.320*** 0.363*** 0.336*** 0.399*** 
  (0.066) (0.105) (0.067) (0.107) 
JPN  0.024 0.129 0.028 0.134 
  (0.063) (0.100) (0.062) (0.099) 
NLD  0.116** 0.151*  0.117** 0.148* 
  (0.056) (0.090) (0.056) (0.090) 
NOR  -0.040 -0.084 -0.054 -0.099 
  (0.067) (0.102) (0.068) (0.104) 
SWE  0.093 0.133 0.086 0.125 
  (0.077) (0.118) (0.080) (0.124) 
USA  -0.066 -0.099 -0.069 -0.103 
  (0.065) (0.100) (0.066) (0.102) 
              
Observations  709 624 709 624 
Standard errors in parentheses     
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
In Columns 1 and 2, the average is the simple average deficit in 
the OECD; in Columns 3 and 4 it is replaced by the average 
which excludes own country deficit. Columns 1 and 3 include in 
the sample years 2008 and 2009; Columns 2 and 4 exclude them. 
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Table 15: Spillovers from global fiscal stance, Long term interest rates 
 
SPILLOVERS  Replacing factors  Replacing factors 
LTR  with averages  with corrected 
         averages 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  All No All No 
  Sample Crisis  Sample Crisis 
              
AUS  0.180** 0.170  0.182** 0.173 
  (0.076) (0.119) (0.077) (0.121) 
AUT  0.107* 0.139  0.107* 0.138 
  (0.061) (0.097) (0.061) (0.097) 
BEL  0.140** 0.180*  0.139** 0.179* 
  (0.063) (0.099) (0.063) (0.100) 
CAN  0.085 0.181*  0.087 0.185* 
  (0.070) (0.107) (0.071) (0.109) 
DEU  0.068 0.167*  0.066 0.165* 
  (0.062) (0.098) (0.062) (0.098) 
DNK  0.110* 0.175* 0.111* 0.178* 
  (0.062) (0.099) (0.063) (0.100) 
ESP  0.340*** 0.428*** 0.354*** 0.442*** 
  (0.071) (0.112) (0.073) (0.113) 
FIN  0.248*** 0.362*** 0.257*** 0.377*** 
  (0.071) (0.113) (0.074) (0.117) 
FRA  0.128** 0.190** 0.127** 0.189** 
  (0.059) (0.094) (0.059) (0.094) 
GBR  0.201*** 0.275**  0.206*** 0.279** 
  (0.070) (0.110) (0.072) (0.113) 
IRE  0.293*** 0.257**  0.296*** 0.260** 
  (0.074) (0.105) (0.076) (0.107) 
ITA  0.427*** 0.569*** 0.444*** 0.605*** 
  (0.070) (0.110) (0.071) (0.111) 
JPN  0.131* 0.319***  0.135* 0.325*** 
  (0.070) (0.111) (0.070) (0.110) 
NLD  0.098 0.134 0.095 0.131 
  (0.062) (0.098) (0.062) (0.098) 
NOR  0.034 0.029 0.029 0.017 
  (0.070) (0.111) (0.071) (0.112) 
SWE  0.174** 0.268** 0.171** 0.270** 
  (0.078) (0.121) (0.080) (0.127) 
USA  0.042 0.051 0.039 0.045 
  (0.071) (0.110) (0.073) (0.112) 
              
Observations  709 624 709 624 
Standard errors in parentheses     
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
In Columns 1 and 2, the average is the simple average deficit in 
the OECD; in Columns 3 and 4 it is replaced by the average 
which excludes own country deficit. Columns 1 and 3 include 
in the sample years 2008 and 2009; Columns 2 and 4 exclude 
them. 
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Table 16: Robustness, factor interpretations 
   RINT LTR  SLOPE 
    (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
  All Sample  No Crisis  All Sample  No Crisis  All Sample  No Crisis 
                    
Int Rate - Short  0.407***  0.398***  0.418***  0.395***  -0.576***  -0.624*** 
 [0.037]  [0.040]  [0.036]  [0.040] [0.065] [0.083] 
GDP Growth  0.110*  0.115*  0.112*  0.113  0.241**  0.200* 
 [0.057]  [0.063]  [0.059]  [0.068] [0.104] [0.096] 
Inflation -0.228**  -0.207***  0.070  0.078  0.121  0.209* 
 [0.080]  [0.063]  [0.046]  [0.049] [0.083] [0.100] 
Def/GDP(-1) 0.053***  0.040**  0.024*  0.015  0.003  -0.021 
 [0.014]  [0.015]  [0.013]  [0.013] [0.027] [0.025] 
Debt/GDP(-1) 0.011***  0.014***  0.008***  0.009***  0.008***  0.011** 
 [0.003]  [0.003]  [0.002]  [0.003] [0.002] [0.004] 
            
Observations 709  624  709  624  714  629 
R-squared 0.959  0.964  0.979  0.980  0.744  0.735 
Number of id  17  17  17  17  17  17 
CSD -3.72  -3.63  -3.58  -3.38  -2.09  -1.65 
CIPS-Error 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Country FE  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Time FE  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Factors Data  Data  Data  Data  Data  Data 
Robust standard errors in brackets 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1           
The dependent variable is the ex-ante real interest rate in Columns 1 and 2; the nominal long term interest 
rate in Columns 3 and 4; the slope in Columns 5 and 6. The independent variables in each column are: 
expected short term interest rate; expected GDP growth; expected Inflation; expected deficit as a share of 
current period GDP; expected gross debt as a share of current period GDP. In Columns 1 - 4, the common 
factors have been replaced by the average short term interest rate and the average deficit in the OECD; in 
Columns 5 and 6, the common factors have been replaced with the weighted average of public debt and 
average deficit in the OECD. CSD is the Pesaran’s (2004) statistic to detect cross-sectional dependence; the 
statistic is distributed as a normal under the null of cross-sectional independence; "CIPS-error" reports the 
p-value from the Pesaran’s (2007) test to detect unit root in the residual; null hypothesis assumes that all 
series in the panel are non-stationary. Columns 1, 3, 5 include in the sample years 2008 and 2009; Columns 
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Table 17: Cross validation test, Real interest rates 
RINT    No No No No No No  No No 
  All  Sample  AUS AUT BEL CAN DEU DNK  ESP  FIN 
                             
Int  Rate  -  Short  0.398***  0.380*** 0.397*** 0.397*** 0.409*** 0.403***  0.409***  0.379*** 0.392*** 
  [0.037]  [0.036] [0.038] [0.038] [0.037] [0.037]  [0.037]  [0.037] [0.037] 
GDP Growth  0.103*  0.105*  0.107*  0.094  0.099  0.113*  0.115*  0.137***  0.071 
  [0.054]  [0.056] [0.058] [0.056] [0.061] [0.053]  [0.054]  [0.042] [0.051] 
Inflation  -0.210**  -0.216** -0.209** -0.210** -0.204** -0.207**  -0.218**  -0.172** -0.198** 
  [0.075]  [0.078] [0.075] [0.076] [0.078] [0.077]  [0.077]  [0.069] [0.079] 
Def/GDP(-1)  0.044***  0.043*** 0.046*** 0.042*** 0.051*** 0.042***  0.046***  0.042**  0.043** 
  [0.014]  [0.014] [0.014] [0.014] [0.013] [0.014]  [0.014]  [0.015] [0.015] 
Debt/GDP(-1)  0.011***  0.012*** 0.011*** 0.012*** 0.011*** 0.011***  0.011***  0.011*** 0.012*** 
  [0.003]  [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003]  [0.003]  [0.003] [0.003] 
              
Observations  709  667 668 667 667 667  667  667 667 
R-squared  0.959  0.960 0.959 0.958 0.959 0.959  0.957  0.959 0.957 
Number  of  id  17  16 16 16 16 16  16  16 16 
CSD  -3.45  -3.32 -3.84 -3.73 -3.28 -3.85  -3.55  -3.35 -3.34 
CIPS-Error  0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00 0.00 
Country  FE  yes  yes yes yes yes yes  yes  yes yes 
Time  FE  yes  yes yes yes yes yes  yes  yes yes 
Factors  yes  yes yes yes yes yes  yes  yes yes 
              
  No  No No No No No  No  No No 
   FRA  GBR  IRE  ITA  JPN  NLD  NOR  SWE  USA 
              
Int  Rate  -  Short  0.399***  0.399*** 0.379*** 0.393*** 0.391*** 0.401***  0.411***  0.409*** 0.403*** 
  [0.037]  [0.040] [0.036] [0.042] [0.038] [0.038]  [0.039]  [0.041] [0.038] 
GDP  Growth  0.106*  0.092 0.096 0.092 0.084  0.110* 0.106* 0.117*  0.095 
  [0.055]  [0.057] [0.065] [0.057] [0.059] [0.056]  [0.057]  [0.055] [0.062] 
Inflation  -0.214**  -0.199** -0.169** -0.220** -0.223** -0.208** -0.262*** -0.234** -0.212** 
  [0.075]  [0.078] [0.073] [0.077] [0.077] [0.080]  [0.068]  [0.087] [0.075] 
Def/GDP(-1)  0.045***  0.042**  0.048**  0.048*** 0.048*** 0.042***  0.043*  0.033**  0.046*** 
  [0.014]  [0.015] [0.016] [0.015] [0.015] [0.014]  [0.023]  [0.012] [0.015] 
Debt/GDP(-1)  0.011***  0.012*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.013*** 0.011***  0.012***  0.009*** 0.011*** 
  [0.003]  [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.004] [0.003]  [0.003]  [0.002] [0.003] 
              
Observations  667  667 667 671 667 667  667  667 667 
R-squared  0.957  0.960 0.960 0.958 0.962 0.959  0.961  0.960 0.962 
Number  of  id  16  16 16 16 16 16  16  16 16 
CSD  -4.01  -3.28 -3.33 -3.39 -3.56 -3.81  -3.57  -3.37 -3.48 
CIPS-Error  0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00 0.00 
Country  FE  yes  yes yes yes yes yes  yes  yes yes 
Time  FE  yes  yes yes yes yes yes  yes  yes yes 
Factors  yes  yes yes yes yes yes  yes  yes yes 
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                Table 18: Cross validation test, Long term interest rates 
 LTR      No No No No No No No No 
  All  Sample  AUS AUT BEL CAN DEU DNK ESP  FIN 
                             
Int  Rate  -  Short  0.397***  0.367*** 0.399*** 0.397*** 0.411*** 0.401*** 0.404*** 0.389*** 0.391*** 
  [0.035]  [0.026] [0.036] [0.036] [0.034] [0.035] [0.034] [0.036] [0.036] 
GDP  Growth  0.100*  0.104* 0.109* 0.094*  0.098 0.110**  0.112**  0.117** 0.057 
  [0.050]  [0.051] [0.052] [0.051] [0.057] [0.049] [0.052] [0.048] [0.035] 
Inflation  0.078  0.072 0.079 0.081  0.087*  0.074 0.078  0.092*  0.095* 
  [0.046]  [0.049] [0.047] [0.047] [0.047] [0.048] [0.049] [0.044] [0.048] 
Def/GDP(-1)  0.016  0.014 0.016 0.015  0.023*  0.015 0.018 0.017 0.013 
  [0.013]  [0.012] [0.013] [0.012] [0.012] [0.013] [0.013] [0.014] [0.013] 
Debt/GDP(-1)  0.008***  0.009*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 
  [0.002]  [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.003] [0.003] 
            
Observations  709  667 668 667 667 667 667 667 667 
R-squared  0.979  0.980 0.979 0.979 0.979 0.979 0.978 0.978 0.978 
Number  of  id  17  16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 
CSD  -3.53  -3.52 -3.90 -3.75 -3.42 -3.85 -3.61 -3.46 -3.37 
CIPS-Error  0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Country  FE  yes  yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Time  FE  yes  yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Factors  yes  yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
            
  No  No No No No No No No No 
   FRA  GBR  IRE  ITA  JPN  NLD  NOR  SWE  USA 
            
Int  Rate  -  Short  0.397***  0.399*** 0.392*** 0.388*** 0.393*** 0.397*** 0.397*** 0.407*** 0.406*** 
  [0.035]  [0.038] [0.035] [0.038] [0.036] [0.036] [0.039] [0.035] [0.036] 
GDP  Growth  0.101*  0.090  0.100 0.094* 0.085 0.106*  0.108*  0.108* 0.095 
  [0.051]  [0.053] [0.062] [0.053] [0.051] [0.051] [0.054] [0.053] [0.056] 
Inflation  0.077  0.088*  0.088 0.070 0.060 0.078 0.079 0.040 0.080 
  [0.047]  [0.048] [0.050] [0.048] [0.047] [0.048] [0.054] [0.038] [0.046] 
Def/GDP(-1)  0.016  0.015 0.015 0.018 0.019 0.015 0.025 0.006 0.018 
  [0.013]  [0.013] [0.014] [0.014] [0.013] [0.013] [0.019] [0.009] [0.013] 
Debt/GDP(-1)  0.008***  0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008***  0.009**  0.008*** 0.008*** 0.006*** 0.008*** 
  [0.002]  [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.003] [0.002] [0.002] [0.001] [0.002] 
            
Observations  667  667 667 671 667 667 667 667 667 
R-squared  0.978  0.979 0.979 0.978 0.980 0.979 0.980 0.979 0.980 
Number  of  id  16  16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 
CSD  -4.12  -3.41 -3.39 -3.42 -3.50 -3.90 -3.53 -3.49 -3.56 
CIPS-Error  0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Country  FE  yes  yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Time  FE  yes  yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Factors  yes  yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
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Table 19: Cross validation test, Slope of the yield curve 
SLOPE       No No No No  No No No No 
  All  Sample  AUS AUT BEL CAN  DEU DNK ESP  FIN 
                             
Int Rate - Short  -0.652***  -0.591***  -0.651***  -0.665***  -0.650***  -0.656*** -0.637*** -0.687*** -0.644*** 
 [0.086]  [0.082]  [0.088]  [0.085]  [0.099]  [0.087] [0.082] [0.091] [0.087] 
GDP Growth  0.360**  0.373**  0.365**  0.343**  0.295**  0.349**  0.406***  0.394***  0.388** 
 [0.124]  [0.129]  [0.127]  [0.125]  [0.123]  [0.125] [0.116] [0.123] [0.134] 
Inflation  0.146  0.176*  0.159 0.157  0.154  0.151 0.110  0.179* 0.118 
 [0.095]  [0.095]  [0.098]  [0.096]  [0.098]  [0.099] [0.091] [0.093] [0.099] 
Def/GDP(-1) -0.016  -0.015  -0.019  -0.021  -0.012  -0.020 -0.017 -0.021 -0.018 
 [0.033]  [0.032]  [0.033]  [0.033]  [0.035]  [0.033] [0.034] [0.032] [0.033] 
Debt/GDP(-1)  0.005  0.004 0.005 0.006  0.005  0.005 0.006 0.005 0.005 
 [0.003]  [0.003]  [0.003]  [0.004]  [0.003]  [0.003] [0.004] [0.003] [0.003] 
              
Observations  714  672 672 672  672  672 672 672 672 
R-squared  0.735  0.736 0.727 0.730  0.731  0.727 0.737 0.730 0.729 
Number  of  id 17  16 16 16  16  16 16 16 16 
CSD  -2.63  -2.34 -2.93 -2.94  -2.36  -3.05 -2.68 -2.55 -2.45 
CIPS-Error  0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Country  FE  yes  yes yes yes  yes  yes yes yes yes 
Time  FE  yes  yes yes yes  yes  yes yes yes yes 
Factors  yes  yes yes yes  yes  yes yes yes yes 
                
  No  No No No  No  No No No No 
 FRA  GBR  IRE  ITA  JPN  NLD  NOR  SWE  USA 
              
Int Rate - Short  -0.662***  -0.632***  -0.624***  -0.693***  -0.660***  -0.659*** -0.674*** -0.665*** -0.627*** 
 [0.084]  [0.094]  [0.076]  [0.095]  [0.089]  [0.088] [0.091] [0.089] [0.096] 
GDP  Growth  0.351**  0.337** 0.328** 0.383***  0.370**  0.356** 0.419*** 0.359**  0.300** 
 [0.126]  [0.130]  [0.144]  [0.126]  [0.133]  [0.128] [0.121] [0.128] [0.136] 
Inflation 0.150  0.128  0.105  0.131  0.126  0.153  0.213**  0.133  0.168 
 [0.097]  [0.093]  [0.097]  [0.101]  [0.096]  [0.101] [0.096] [0.117] [0.097] 
Def/GDP(-1) -0.017  -0.024  -0.030  -0.010 -0.013 -0.018 0.034 -0.020 -0.011 
 [0.035]  [0.027]  [0.027]  [0.038]  [0.034]  [0.034] [0.034] [0.035] [0.034] 
Debt/GDP(-1)  0.004  0.006 0.006 0.005  0.010**  0.005 0.005 0.004 0.005 
 [0.003]  [0.004]  [0.003]  [0.003]  [0.004]  [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] 
              
Observations  672  672 672 672  672  672 672 672 672 
R-squared  0.731  0.724 0.799 0.743  0.745  0.727 0.743 0.735 0.740 
Number  of  id 16  16 16 16  16  16 16 16 16 
CSD  -2.65  -2.36 -4.06 -2.31  -2.35  -3.12 -2.52 -2.45 -2.29 
CIPS-Error  0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Country  FE  yes  yes yes yes  yes  yes yes yes yes 
Time  FE  yes  yes yes yes  yes  yes yes yes yes 
Factors  yes  yes yes yes  yes  yes yes yes yes 
    Robust standard errors in brackets;  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 20: Introducing the Current Account on the right-hand side 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
  RINT LTR  SLOPE 
      
Int Rate - Short  0.449***  0.429***  -0.556*** 
 [0.064]  [0.049]  [0.091] 
Inflation 0.088  -0.188**  0.164* 
 [0.059]  [0.075]  [0.091] 
Growth 0.068  0.085  0.341** 
 [0.059]  [0.055]  [0.138] 
Def/GDP(-1) -0.000  0.034 0.014 
 [0.023]  [0.022]  [0.037] 
Debt/GDP(-1) 0.010***  0.013*** 0.007 
 [0.003]  [0.003]  [0.004] 
CA/GDP(-1) 0.002  0.006  0.027 
 [0.009]  [0.009]  [0.019] 
Observations 709 709 714 
R-squared 0.968  0.951  0.733 
Number of id  17  17  17 
CSD -2.62  -3.03  -2.61 
CIPS-Error 0.00  0.00  0.00 
Robust standard errors in brackets 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
CSD is the Pesaran’s (2004) statistic to detect cross-sectional dependence; the 
statistic is distributed as a normal under the null of cross-sectional independence; 
"CIPS-error" reports the p-value from the Pesaran’s (2007) test to detect unit root in 
the residual; null hypothesis assumes that all series in the panel are non-stationary. 
 

























 (1)  (2)  (3) 
  RINT LTR  SLOPE 
      
Int Rate - Short  0.313***  0.297***  -0.622*** 
 [0.040]  [0.037]  [0.108] 
Inflation 0.095**  -0.103**  0.134 
 [0.042]  [0.042]  [0.103] 
Growth 0.040  0.027  0.203* 
 [0.052]  [0.053]  [0.099] 
Def/GDP(-1) 0.024  0.049**  -0.079 
 [0.014]  [0.019]  [0.074] 
Debt/GDP(-1)  0.001 0.005* 0.001 
 [0.002]  [0.003]  [0.008] 
      
Observations 624 624 629 
R-squared 0.987  0.979  0.808 
Number of id  17  17  17 
CSD -3.53  -3.60  -2.79 
CIPS-Error 0.00  0.00  0.00 
Robust standard errors in brackets 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
CSD is the Pesaran’s (2004) statistic to detect cross-sectional dependence; the statistic 
is distributed as a normal under the null of cross-sectional independence; "CIPS-error" 
reports the p-value from the Pesaran’s (2007) test to detect unit root in the residual; 
null hypothesis assumes that all series in the panel are non-stationary.   58
 
Table 22: Real interest rate 
 Factor1  Factor2 
 RINT  RINT 
    
Average IRS  0.970***   
 (0.0356)   
Average DEF    0.909*** 
   (0.0609) 
Constant -9.83e-10  -5.08e-09 
 (0.0352)  (0.0603) 
    
Observations 49  49 
R-squared 0.941  0.826 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
In Column 1, the dependent variable is the first 
factor extracted from Wt
rlty while the 
independent variable is the average interest rate 
in the OECD; In Column 2; the dependent 
variable is the second factor extracted from 
Wt
rlty while the independent variable is the 
average deficit in the OECD. 
 
 
Table 23: Long term interest rate 
 Factor1  Factor2 
 LTR  LTR 
    
Average IRS  0.979***   
 (0.0297)   
Average DEF    0.903*** 
   (0.0626) 
Constant 3.31e-09  6.08e-09 
 (0.0294)  (0.0619) 
    
Observations 49  49 
R-squared 0.959  0.816 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
In Column 1, the dependent variable is the first 
factor extracted from  Wt
nlty while the 
independent variable is the average interest rate 
in the OECD; In Column 2, the dependent 
variable is the second factor extracted from 
Wt
nlty while the independent variable is the 
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Table 24: Slope of the yield curve 
 Factor1  Factor2 
 SLOPE  SLOPE 
    
Average DEBT  0.877***   
 (0.0595)   
Average DEF    0.887*** 
   (0.0672) 
Constant 1.87E-07  -2.73E-09 
 (0.0587)  (0.0666) 
    
Observations 42  49 
R-squared 0.845  0.787 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
In Column 1, the dependent variable is the first 
factor extracted from  Wt
slope while the 
independent variable is a weigthed average of 
the debt to GDP ratio in the OECD; In Column 
2, the dependent variable is the second factor 
extracted from Wt
slope while the independent 
























Figure 1: Nominal Long term interest rates, 1990-2010 













Figure 2: Ex-Ante Real Long term interest rates, 1990-2010 
NOR SWE DNK FIN IRE
ITA ESP AUT BEL NLD FRA
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Spillover coefficients for Real term rates - using averages





































































Spillover coefficients for Real term rates - using corrected averages
All sample Excluding the crisis
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Spillover coefficients for Long term rates - using averages
































































Spillover coefficients for Long term rates - using corrected averages
All sample Excluding the crisis
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Figure 11: Spillover Coefficients for Long term interest rate and long term interest rate at the 






























Long term interest rate (1989h1)
Spillover - LTR Fitted values
All Sample
Spillover Coefficients for LTR and Beginning of Period LTR
   66






























1995h1 2000h1 2005h1 2010h1
end
Public Debt
Dashed Lines are +/- 2*s.e.



































1995h1 2000h1 2005h1 2010h1
end
Public Debt
Dashed Lines are +/- 2*s.e.
Dependent Variable: Nominal Interest Rate
 
 
   67


































1995h1 2000h1 2005h1 2010h1
end
Public Debt






























   68
Figure 15: Interpretation of the common factors extracted from 
rlty
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Figure 16: Interpretation of the common factors extracted from 
nlty
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Figure 17: Interpretation of the common factors extracted from 
slope
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